III. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT AGONISTIC STRUCTURES

Note: See Orality and Literacy: 42-45, 69-70.


(III.1a) Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business/Random House, 2012. Topics: Economic History; Cultural Studies. Also see Appleby (III.4); Beinhocker (II.3); de Sota (XII.25); Diamond (III.38b); R. H. Frank (III.60a); R. H. Frank and Cook (III.60b); Freeland (III.71a); B. Friedman (XII.48); Hacker and Pierson (XII.63); Krugman (XII.82; XII.83); Landes (III.111b); Marmot (III.117b); Mokyr (XII.103); Warsh (XII.165); Wilkinson and Pickett (III.171a).

(III.2) Anonymous. The Gospel According to John. Trans. David M. Stanley. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 1365-93. Probably written in the decades of the 90s CE. The anonymous author of the Gospel of John was motivated by the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate to stand up for his convictions about the significance of Jesus and to denigrate the Jews of his time who did not share his convictions about Jesus by making the Jews of Jesus’ time in the story the villains. As the author portrays the Jews in the story that he constructed, they are roughly comparable to the suitors in the Homeric epic the Odyssey. Also see Crossan (III.35); Fredriksen (III.71); Carroll (III.23).

(III.3) Anonymous. The Gospel According to Mark. Trans. M. Jack Suggs. The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfield, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 1304-26. Probably written around 70 CE. The historical Jesus was a non-violent hero; his life and death were heroic. But the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark constructed a hero story to rival the Homeric epic the Iliad. In the Iliad Achilles is told by his goddess-mother that two fates await him: (1) he can leave Troy and the war and go home, in which case he will live a long life; or (2) he can return to fight again in the war, in which case he will die in the war and not return home. After certain events unfold, Achilles chooses to return to the war and fight again, knowing full well that he will die in the war and not return home. With the well-known example of Achilles in mind, the Greek-educated
anonymous author wrote the Gospel of Mark in Greek in such a way that he portrayed the character named Jesus as predicting not once, not twice, but three times his own upcoming suffering and death in Jerusalem, and then walking heroically straight into Jerusalem to meet his predicted suffering and death. In this way, the anonymous author has constructed the greatest hero story ever told – he topped Homer! That’s the agonistic spirit at work – go up against the best Greek storyteller and surpass the best storyteller with your own carefully constructed story. Also see MacDonald (I.103).


(III.5) Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries. 61 vols. Cambridge, UK: Blackfriars; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1981. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Klubertanz (XII.81a); McInerny (XII.94a). Because medieval Islamic culture is not usually considered to be part of Western culture, Thomas Aquinas is arguably the greatest medieval Aristotelian philosopher. Both the Dominican and the Jesuit religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church have taught Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy over the years. As a result, Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy has been taught to more people and has been studied by more people in Western culture over the centuries than any other specific philosophy. Even though the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate is exemplified in the literary genre known as a dialogue (e.g., Plato’s dialogues), Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae is arguably the most famous exemplification of the agonistic spirit in the Western tradition, because of the way in which Aquinas systematically lists real or imagined adversarial objections and then proceeds to reply to each objection one by one.

(III.5a) Bailyn, Bernard, ed. The Debate on the Constitution. 2 vols. New York: Library of America. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Maier (III.115b); Wills (III.172a).

(III.6) Bakan, David. The Duality of Human Existence: An Essay on Psychology and Religion. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Topics: Cultural Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Farrell (III.46; XII.37b); Helgeson (III.81); Ong (III.134); Sullivan (III.162). David Bakan (1921-2004) of the University of Chicago defines and explains two central tendencies in human nature, which he refers to as agency and communion. What he means by agency is the psychodynamics of the agonistic spirit discussed by Ong (III.134). Ong never tired of championing I-thou communication,
which involves communion. In *The Psychology of Gender* (III.81), Vicki S. Helgeson in psychology at Carnegie Mellon University works with Bakan’s terms of agency and communion. In my article “The Female and Male Modes of Rhetoric” (III.46), I have defined two modes of rhetoric that decidedly resemble what Bakan means by agency and communion. I make the following brief characterizations: “The thinking represented in the female mode [of rhetoric] seems eidetic, methectic, open-ended, and generative, whereas the thinking in the male mode [of rhetoric] appears framed, contained, more pre-selected, and packaged” (910; also see Sullivan [III.162]). In Western culture historically, agency is stereotypically masculine; communion, stereotypically feminine. But according to Bakan, we should work toward a balance of agency and communion in our lives. According to Bakan, a person who has over-developed agency but seriously under-developed communion is not a well-balanced person. By this standard, certain American men are not well-balanced persons. But we could argue that many American men have been encouraged to over-develop their agency, on the one hand, and, on the other, to seriously under-develop the communion dimension of their lives, because of biases in our Western cultural conditioning. Conversely, according to Bakan, a person who has over-developed communion but seriously under-developed agency is not a well-balanced person. By this standard, certain American women are not well-balanced persons. However, we could argue that many American women have not been allowed to develop their agency, on the one hand, and, on the other, have been encouraged to over-develop the communion dimension of their lives, because of biases in our Western cultural conditioning. But remember that in the 1960s Ong was saying that we in Western culture were already undergoing a shift in our cultural conditioning and consciousness because of the impact of the communication media that accentuate sound. As a result of this shift in our cultural conditioning and consciousness, perhaps many Americans will be able to work out a better balance of agency and communion in their lives. For example, when men today are urged to get in touch with the feminine side of life, this recommendation is best understood to mean that they should develop the communion dimension in their lives. In theory, a person could work out an optimal development of both agency and communion. Such an optimally developed person could be referred to as androgynous. I have discussed psychological androgyny at length in my essay “Secondary Orality and Consciousness Today” (XII.37b). In theory, a person could be seriously under-developed in both agency and communion. But I do not have a term to use to refer to such a seriously under-development.


(III.9) Bercovitch, Sacvan. *The American Jeremiad: Anniversary Edition, with a New Preface*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 2012. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. American jeremiads can be understood as being examples of the kind of civic rhetoric that Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric. However, in *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (III.138), Ong suggests that Ramism is monologic, which is to say that Ramism fostered the art of reason. Elsewhere, Ong works with the terms polemic and irenic. Because the art of discourse requires the refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s), the art of discourse is polemical in structure. By contrast, the art of reason is not polemical, but irenic. American jeremiads are argumentative in the sense of arguing about something that is indeed truly debatable and therefore seemingly polemical. However, because of the influence of Ramism, American jeremiads are not usually structured in such a way as to include a refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s). As a result, American jeremiads can be understood as a form of what Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric, not a form of the kind of pro-and-con debate found in deliberative rhetoric or forensic rhetoric.


(III.10a) Biberman, Matthew. *Masculinity, Anti-Semitism and Early Modern English Literature*. Ashgate, 2004. Topics: Early Modern Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Josephus (III.105); Nirenberg (III.128f).


(III.12a) Bottum, Joseph. *An Anxious Age: The Post-Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of America*. New York: Image, 2014. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Dorrien (III.40); Jenkins (III.93); Levin (III.111d); Linker (III.111e); Steinfels (III.161a).

(III.13) Bowra, C. M. *Heroic Poetry*. London: Macmillan, 1952. Topics: Classical Studies; Literary Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Broich (III.14); Burckhardt (III.18); Campbell (III.20); Deme (III.38); Edwards (III.43); Hook and Reno (III.86); Isser (III.90); Kelber (III.106); McNamee (III.121); Mobley (III.123); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Moss (III.125); Nagy (III.126); Parks (III.142); Waith (III.169); Whitman (III.171).


(III.19) Cairns, Douglas L. *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1993. Topic: Classical Studies. Also see Bennett (III.8a); Bowman (III.12b); Cash (III.23a); deSilva (III.38a); Foxhall and Salmon (III.68a); Freeman (III.71b); Krause (III.110a); McNamee (III.121); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Neyrey (III.128e); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Rosen and Sluiter (III.152b); Salzman (III.157).
In his classic book Joseph Campbell has discussed what he discerns to be the overall pattern of the life-stories of heroes who commit themselves to live heroic lives of virtue. (For another discernment of the most salient pattern, based on C. G. Jung’s work, see Erich Neumann’s *The Origins and History of Consciousness*.) Stories of imaginary heroes who committed themselves to live heroic lives of virtue are too numerous to enumerate here. But out of the ancient Western world have come stories about three historical persons who committed themselves to striving to live a heroic life of virtue: Socrates, Jesus, and Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. By definition, all saints canonized by the Roman Catholic Church are supposed to have led heroic lives of virtue. That does not mean that they were perfect. But it does mean that their efforts to live virtuous lives were heroic. More Americans should commit themselves to striving to live a heroic life of virtue, instead of living like anti-heroes such as Shakespeare’s character Falstaff. To Falstaff, the word “honor” is nothing but an empty sound signifying nothing but sound and fury. That’s the anti-hero for you. But the hero knows better. The hero values self-love and self-respect and self-regard. As a result, the hero is committed to striving to live a heroic life of virtue.


(III.21a) ---. *Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001. Topics: Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Blanshard (XII.13); Botticini and Eckstein (IX.12a); Crossan (III.35); Eisner (III.44); Fischel and Ortmann (III.64); Josephus (III.105); Neusner (I.122); Nirenberg (III.128f); O’Malley (XII.109); Sherry (X.44c); Ventresca (III.166a).


(III.27a) Clarke, Thurston. *Ask Not: The Inauguration of John F. Kennedy and the Speech that Changed America*. New York: Henry Holt, 2004. Topics: History of Rhetoric; American Studies. When I was in high school, I was so impressed with President Kennedy’s call to ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country that I wrote a short op-ed piece about it in the student newspaper.


(III.28a) Colby, Tanner. *Some of My Best Friends Are Black: The Strange Story of Integration in America*. New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2012. Topic: American Studies. Also see King (III.108; III.108a); Patillo-McCoy (XII.138a); Sharkey (XII.152b). In-groups and out-groups have been formed in different societies over the centuries. For example, in ancient times, we find the Greek/barbarian categorization of a certain in-group (Greeks) versus the out-group (barbarians = all non-Greeks), the Jew/gentile categorization (gentiles = all non-Jews), and the Christian/pagan categorization (pagans = all non-Christians). In more recent centuries, in American culture down to the 1960s, we find that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) dominated the prestige culture, relegating everybody else to the out-group (= all non-whites and all non-Anglo-Saxons and all non-Protestants). However, in each of these examples, the people in the supposed out-group usually were not one cohesive group. Instead, they were several out-groups. For example, blacks were one out-group, even though most of them were Protestants. Roman Catholics were another out-group, even though most of them were white. Jews were another out-group, even though most of them were white. And so on. Nevertheless, in American culture in the 1950s and 1960s, the black civil rights movement managed to win widespread support among certain whites, resulting in landmark civil rights legislation under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Tragically, President Johnson also escalated American involvement in the Vietnam war, and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the black civil rights movement, was also involved in anti-war protests. Tragically, Dr. King was assassinated in 1968. His assassination sparked riots in certain parts of the country. After Richard M. Nixon was elected president in 1968, it fell to his administration to help restore law and order, on the one hand, and, on the other, restore peace and calm and hope among blacks by promoting affirmative action and so-called black capitalism. But in the years following Dr. King’s tragic assassination, his dream of racial integration met with resistance not only from many whites, but also from certain blacks. In his book *Some of My Best Friends Are Black: The Strange Story of Integration in America*, Tanner Colby says, “If children conform to the standards set by their peers, in the 1970s and 1980s the peer pressure for black children to keep with their own was intense” (page 33). In the terminology of in-groups and out-groups, they were being pressured to form a cohesive in-group of their own – ostensibly to resist certain efforts toward integration and to celebrate their own cultural heritage. Up to a certain point, this trend is understandable and even defensible. However, when peer pressure works to suggest that getting an education is somehow not a good thing, this kind of attitude about getting an education can be
self-defeating in the long run. Regarding the schools, Colby pointedly says, “To say that America’s schools are resegregating is to misstate the facts. They can’t resegregate. They’ve never integrated. The absence of artificial transfer programs to shuttle kids around just means we’re seeing the country for what it has been all along. What it never stopped being” (pages 204-205). Colby’s book is designed to be a kind of report card about Dr. King’s dream of integration – or at least a kind of report about it. Colby centers his attention on four places: (1) Birmingham, Alabama, where he went to school at suburban Vestavia during the heyday of busing to achieve racial integration; (2) Kansas City, Missouri, where he perceptively focuses on housing issues; (3) Madison Avenue, where he worked at one time as a copy writer in an advertising company; (4) Lafayette, Louisiana, where he spent his toddlerhood and the early years of his life. In this way, he proceeds to discuss integration in education, housing, work, and church. He interviewed certain people regarding issues about integration in each of these areas. In my estimate the interviews are the best parts of the book. (He now lives, with his wife, in Brooklyn, New York.) As Colby shows, J.C. Nichols started his high-status housing segregation in Mission Hills, an area in Kansas City, Missouri, decades before the white flight to segregated suburbs in more recent decades. Disclosure: I grew up in a white working-class neighborhood in Kansas City, Kansas, but I am quite familiar with Kansas City, Missouri, and with the white suburban areas in Johnson County, Kansas. In addition, in my first and second years in college, I attended Rockhurst College, the Jesuit college on Troost Avenue in Kansas City, Missouri. Now known as Rockhurst University, Colby discusses the neighborhood around it in his extended treatment of housing in Kansas City, Missouri. He describes Troost Avenue as the Berlin wall – with Rockhurst on the east side of Troost – the wrong side to be on to receive pizza deliveries. Just to the west side of Troost is the University of Missouri – Kansas City (UMKC). As Colby recounts, some faculty from UMKC and other home-owners east of Troost formed a broad neighborhood organization to protect their housing investments from the perfectly legal block-busting approaches of certain real-estate profiteers. Concerning advertising, Colby says, “Advertising is aspirational. It takes what people want to believe about themselves and then sells it back to them in the form of a car or a house or an iPod. At the end of the day, people don’t really aspire to whiteness or blackness. Back in Kansas City, J.C. Nichols wasn’t selling segregated housing. He was selling status. . . . The gold standard for any brand is to achieve a global status that transcends those [cultural and linguistic] barriers, that needs no translation. Nike. Apple. BMW. They’re not black. They’re not white. They’re just cool. That’s the brand that makes money. And the only way to be that brand is by connecting with each individual personally while still having a message that resonates universally. Which is why good advertising is really hard to do, and why most of it sucks” (page 213; his emphasis). But J.C. Nichols was not the only person selling
status. Arguably, all advertising is attempting to sell status. We Americans tend to be status-seekers, as Vance Packard pointed out decades ago in his book *The Status Seekers* (1959), the follow up to his widely read critique of advertising, *The Hidden Persuaders* (1957). But if advertising is aspirational, so were Dr. King’s speeches about integration. In Colby’s words, Dr. King took what many people wanted to believe about themselves and sold them on the justice and timeliness of the black civil rights movement. Even so, he wasn’t selling them a material commodity, exactly. Instead, he was selling them his dream of integration – a dream that many white Americans bought into, but by no means all whites. But what is Colby selling in his book? Basically, he is selling a tough-minded look at the efforts toward integration that Dr. King’s speeches helped inspire. To be sure, Colby interviewed certain people whose successes are worth reporting – and worth reading about. The aspirational dimension of his book comes from those winning stories of experiences of modest success. Yes, we Americans collectively should cheer for the people involved in the modest successes that Colby recounts. In addition, we should celebrate the end of Jim Crow laws in the South and the enlargement of the black middle class in recent decades. We also have greater diversity in the prestige culture in America today than we had in, say, the 1950s. However, for the most part, Colby is advertising the decidedly disappointing results of the efforts toward integration. From the time of President Johnson’s administration onward, we Americans collectively have expended an enormous amount of time and energy and money from the federal and state and local governments and from private sources in working on efforts toward integration. Our collective expenditures of these resources have been gigantic – leading to massive busing efforts and many other schemes involving magnet schools. The British poet Robert Browning famously wrote, “A man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for?” Thus far, Dr. King’s dream of integration has exceeded our grasp. Dr. King’s dream of integration is a vision -- it is visionary -- just as certain statements in the Declaration of Independence are visionary -- aspirational. It’s a goal toward which we Americans can choose to work, if we want to. But to work toward the goal of integration, we should be as tough-minded as Colby is about just how hard meaningful integration is to work out. Yes, to be sure, there is a systemic dimension to the institutional structures in American society that work against integration. The systemic dimension should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, as Colby shows, we should not overlook the individuals, either. In the final analysis, the optimal form of integration will involve individuals who freely choose to help advance integration. In the meantime, Colby’s book shows that the time has come for tough-minded Americans to go back to the drawing board, as we say, and come up with new ways to help advance Dr. King’s dream of integration.


(III.36) Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. The experience of flow in work or play involves engaging the energies of what Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette (III.124) refer to as the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the human psyche. Anthony de Mello (I.42) also refers to flow. But he uses the idea of flow in such an expansive way that it would include not only the optimal experiences of Warrior energies, but also the optimal experiences of the other archetypes of maturity discussed by Moore and Gillette (I.121; I.122; I.123).


(III.41) ---. *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1993. Topic: American Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Jenkins (III.93); Linker (III.111); Steinfelds (III.161a).

(III.42) Douglass, James W. *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Carroll (III.22); Clarke (III.27b); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); Gibson (III.72e); Janney (III.91); Jenkins (III.93); Leaming (III.111b); Mahoney (III.115a); Nelson (III.127b); Newman (III.128d); Stone (III.161c); Wills (III.172). In my estimate, the best book
about President Kennedy’s assassination is *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters* by James W. Douglass, a Catholic peacenik. Douglass has thoroughly researched JFK’s assassination. The notes in his book fill up nearly 100 pages. Because of the sheer complexity of the events involved, Douglass provides a chronology of events from 1961 to 1963 on pages xxi-xxxi. In chapter one he gives us an overview. But in each subsequent chapter he dives in and gives us really detailed accounts of events involving an enormous number of people. Fortunately, his book includes a good index. Douglass borrows the term “the unspeakable” in his title from another Catholic peacenik, the Trappist monk Thomas Merton. As a matter of fact, Douglass quotes Merton frequently in this book. Indeed, Douglass describes Merton as “my Virgil on this pilgrimage” (x). Surprise, surprise, Douglass’s thesis is that President Kennedy, who sounded like a strident warrior in the Cold War in the 1960 presidential campaign (with his mistaken claim that there was a missile gap), was turning into a Catholic peacenik after his apocalyptic confrontation with the (now former) Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis. Disclosure: Because I participated in demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, I am also a peacenik. In any event, thanks to the non-violent resolution of that crisis, we are all still here today and able to talk about it. The world has never come so close to a nuclear holocaust as it did in the Cuban missile crisis. Subsequently, President Kennedy was working through back-channel correspondence with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev toward establishing peace between the two superpowers. Eventually, they did work out a test-ban treaty. President Kennedy was also working through back channels to establish peace with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Moreover, President Kennedy was not eager to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, as his successor eventually did. Furthermore, President Kennedy was helping the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the black civil rights movement in the United States. One sly ad for Goldwater in 1963 said, “Kennedy for King/ Goldwater for President.” In addition, President Kennedy had effectively turned back the increase in the price of steel instigated by U.S. Steel and its allies in the steel industry. President Kennedy also had worked effectively to help support emerging nationalism in Africa. I should also mention here that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was carrying on a crusade against organized crime, even though Douglass does not mention this crusade. In sum, there was no shortage of ways in which President Kennedy had done things that did not please certain powerful and influential people in the United States. But doesn’t peace sounds like a good idea? Evidently, peace didn’t sound like a good idea to a number of powerful Americans who conspired together to have President Kennedy assassinated and to set up Lee Harvey Oswald to be the patsy to take the blame. Those powerful Americans were locked into what former President Dwight Eisenhower styled the military-industrial complex, which Douglass refers to as the national security state. Their mentality was Manichaean, based on their militant anti-communism.
Some in the CIA were megalomaniacs; they hated peaceniks. As everybody knows, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had extensive experience in assassinations – inspired by their militantly anti-communism. Douglass has no doubt that the CIA was involved in President Kennedy’s assassination and in setting up Oswald to be the patsy and take the blame. Now, earlier, certain dreamers in the CIA dreamed up the ridiculous scenario that is known as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. The CIA dreamers had hoped to trap the young President Kennedy into deciding to provide air cover for this ridiculous invasion. But President Kennedy did not act as they had hoped he would. As a result, the ridiculous invasion was a debacle. Nevertheless, President Kennedy took responsibility for the debacle because he had indeed signed off on the ridiculous plan. (The plan had started to be developed under former President Eisenhower.)


(III.44) Eisner, Peter. The Pope’s Last Crusade: How an American Jesuit Helped Pope Pius XI’s Campaign to Stop Hitler. New York: Morrow/HarperCollins, 2013. Topic: Church History. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Fischel and Ortmann (III.64); Ventresca (III.166a).


Felson, Richard B. Violence & Gender Reexamined. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107b); Mills (III.122b); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129). Richard B. Felson “cites research suggesting that the motives for violence against women are similar to the motives for violence against men: to gain control or retribution and to promote or defend self-image.”

Fetzer, James H. Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits. Dordrecht, Netherlands; and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. Topics: History of Philosophy; History of Technology. Also see Palecek (III.141a). Both James H. Fetzer (born 1940) and I (born 1944) started teaching at the University of Minnesota Duluth in September 1987 – he in philosophy; me in composition (now known as writing studies). A prolific scholar, Fetzer was appointed in 1996 as one of the first ten Distinguished McKnight University Professors in the University of Minnesota. He retired from UMD in 2006; I, in 2009. His specialization is the philosophy of science. But he is not familiar with the generalized empirical method that Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984), has worked out in his philosophical masterpiece Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (IX.48). Unfortunately, Fetzer is not the only scholar in philosophy who has not studied Lonergan’s groundbreaking philosophical masterpiece. The 1978 Harper & Row paperback edition of Lonergan’s Insight features quotations from Stephen Toulmin of the University of Chicago, Time magazine, and Newsweek magazine that are worth quoting here at length.

(1) Stephen Toulmin: “Insight is a masterly work, whose importance
reaches far beyond the boundaries of theology and Catholic philosophy. It has much to say of interest and significance to cognitive psychologists and to students of epistemology. Lonergan’s careful scrutiny of the procedures by which we put our creative intelligences to work is precise, lucid, and fascinating.” (2) *Time*: “In his grasp of the process of understanding that underlies every science, Lonergan is the twentieth century counterpart of a Renaissance Man.” (3) *Newsweek*: “With that boldness characteristic of genius, Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan has set out to do for the twentieth century what even Aquinas could not do for the thirteenth: provide an ‘understanding of understanding’ that can illuminate not only the broad patterns of all accumulated knowledge but also reveal an ‘invariant pattern’ for further developments in human understanding.” As these quotations indicate, Lonergan’s *Insight* is relevant to Fetzer’s specialization in the philosophy of science. Moreover, Lonergan’s way of understanding human understanding is related in spirit to what Ong refers to as noetics and noetic structures. As a result, considered together, Ong and Lonergan have taken Western philosophic thought to an unprecedented new level, leaving Fetzer and many other academics in philosophy behind.

(III.51) ---. *Assassination Science: Experts Speak Out on the Death of JFK*. Chicago: Catfeet P, 1998. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Fetzer (III.55; III.56); Douglas (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Palecek (III.141a); Stone (III.161c). I greatly admire James H. Fetzer’s persistent scholarly interest in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.


(III.54) ---. *The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Human the Only Animals with Minds?* Chicago: Open Court, 2005. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see MacLean (III.115).

(III.55) ---. *The Great Zapruder Film Hoax: Deceit and Deception in the Death of JFK*. Chicago: Catfeet P, 2003. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Stone (III.161c).

Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Janney (III.91); Nelson (III.127b); Stone (III.161c).


(III.59) ---. Render unto Darwin: Philosophical Aspects of the Christian Right’s Crusade against Science. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Evolutionary Theory; Abortion. Also see Gore (III.75); Nanda (III.127). I greatly admire Princeton-educated James H. Fetzer’s critique of the Christian right’s crusade against science. More specifically, I admire his spirit of engaging the Christian right’s critique of science, because we should not have to leave it up to the Harvard-educated politician Al Gore (III.75) to engage the Christian right’s crusade against science. In this book Fetzer also includes a fine chapter about the abortion debate. In this chapter he works with deontological moral theory to work out his own reasonable position regarding the admittedly weighty issue of abortion.


(III.62) ---. Sociobiology and Epistemology. Dordrecht, Netherlands; and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985. Topics: History of Philosophy; Evolutionary Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Ong (III.134); Wilson (III.173a). In Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (III.134), Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong says that his “book goes a bit farther than sociobiology ordinarily does. Indeed, if the term [noobiology] is properly understood, what it [his book] deals with might be called ‘noobiology,’ the biological setting of mental activity (Greek nous, noos, mind). Intellect does not sit on the biological organism like a rider on a horse in a Cartesian or Platonic superdualistic world. Thought itself operates out of genetic as well as intellectual history. It has neurophysiological support or grounding. If a human being is truly a microcosm, as he or she in an even deeper sense than the ancients could have been conscious of, he or she will bring together the extremes of existence: the genetic heritage, which reaches back into the inorganic world, and the biologically unprocessable, genetically free-floating self-consciousness which is the only situs of human intelligence and of its
dialectical complement human freedom. (There is no knowledge or human freedom outside of individual personal consciousness)” (11). In connection with Ong’s claim here about noobiology, I should point out that Ong’s admittedly scattered comments about noetics and noetic structures have not been systematically studied to examine their coherence and cogency. No doubt Ong like to use the terms noobiology, noetics, and noetic structures because they can readily be connected with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s term the noosphere (see II.21). Regarding the ancient use of the term noos, see Menn (X.32) and Engberg-Pedersen (I.55).


(III.65) Fish, Stanley. Save the World on Your Own Time. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Topics: American Studies; History of American Higher Education. Also see Duberman (XII.30); Greenberg (XII.56); Jacoby (XII.74b). Even though Stanley Fish is not familiar with Bernard Lonergan’s Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (IX.48), Fish in effect recommends what Lonergan refers to as the detached, disinterested desire to know. No doubt the desire to save the world can at times be a commendable desire in its proper place. No doubt the desire for social justice can at times be a commendable desire in its proper place. After all, I have not heard any American politician step forward yet to say, “I’m not for social justice. I’m against social justice. I’m for social injustice.” Even conservative Republicans do not say such things. Moreover, the overly fervent pursuit of certain debatable means for supposedly saving the world usually involves over-reach and therefore usually results in generating a predictable backlash, regardless of whether the over-reach involving debatable means is carried out by self-described liberals or self-described conservatives.


(III.72b) Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72d); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); Menninger (III.121a); A. Miller (III.122a); Pinker (III.145).


(III.72d) ---. Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941. A classic. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Fromm (III.72b); Menninger (III.121a); Pinker (III.145). Erich Fromm works out a psychoanalytic account of authoritarianism in terms of sadomasochism. What he refers to as authoritarianism is the equivalent of what David Riesman (X.44) refers to as outer-directed (also known as tradition-directed). It is the basic personality structure of all humanity. But of course Fromm is studying the rise of what became an extremely virulent form of authoritarianism in Germany, which was accompanied by genocide against Jews under Hitler and the Nazis. Riesman’s outer-directed person represent Freud’s oral stage of psychosocial development; Riesman’s inner-directed person, Freud’s anal stage; Riesman’s other-directed person, Freud’s genital stage, or at least the spirit of Freud’s genital stage, if not always the optimal form of the genital stage.


Topics: American Studies; History of American Higher Education. The title “Contending with Modernity” aptly captures the spirit of agonistic adversativeness that has characterized Roman Catholic popes in recent centuries. In the nineteenth century Pope Leo XIII issued the encyclical *Aeternae Patris* (1879, urging educated Catholics to renew their interest in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). As a result of his encyclical, Catholic scholars in Europe and North America went to work studying the texts of Thomas Aquinas very carefully. Over the centuries, not only the Dominicans but also the Jesuits had championed the work of Thomas Aquinas. But Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical renewed scholarly study of Thomas Aquinas and helped advance the teaching of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy in Catholic higher education in the twentieth century. In North America, two noted French Thomists, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, were widely read. In the United States, the Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University, where Walter Ong as a young Jesuit scholastic (i.e., Jesuit seminarian in studies) studied philosophy as part of his Jesuit training, was the leading center of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy for several decades in the twentieth century. Leading Thomists at SLU included Robert J. Henle, S.J., George E. Klubertanz, S.J., and Vernon Bourke. Henle and Klubertanz were zealots for Thomistic metaphysics. In the course on metaphysics that I took from Henle in the spring semester of 1982 at Saint Louis University, he claimed that Kant was not familiar with Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics. In short, Kant had not done his homework. In any event, his and Klubertanz’s zealotry for Thomistic metaphysics influenced other American Catholic educators to emphasize Thomistic metaphysics as the way to begin the undergraduate study of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, which typically involved several required philosophy courses spread over the four years of undergraduate education in many American Catholic colleges and universities, including courses in the philosophy of human nature, the philosophy of God, and ethics – all taught from the standpoint of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Those students who understood what was being taught in those required philosophy courses received an excellent introduction to philosophic thinking. But of course not all the students who took the required courses in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy fully understood the philosophic thinking that was being taught in them. In any event, the required Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy courses were the most conspicuous way in which American Catholic higher education was involved in contending with modernity, but not the only way. Because Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy was emphasized so strongly in American Catholic higher education for several decades in the twentieth century, most college-educated American Catholics were not equally well grounded in the tradition of American pragmatism in philosophy, with the possible exception of those college-educated American Catholics who were educated in non-Catholic colleges and universities (e.g., John F. Kennedy was not educated in Catholic
institutions of education). In the Catholic spirit of contending with modernity, American pragmatism in philosophy was often dismissed with short shrift in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy courses in American Catholic higher education, as were other modern philosophic traditions of thought associated with Kant and Hegel and others. If we think of higher education as a form of acculturation, college-educated students in American Catholic higher education were not being acculturated in American pragmatism in philosophy – or more generally, in the American intellectual tradition. Thus college-educated American Catholics who had received their college education as undergraduates in Catholic higher education were American Catholics being acculturated in the Old World through the emphasis on Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, because American Catholic higher education was dedicated to contending with modernity – the New World in which American Catholics just happened to be living. Conversely, scholars who specialize in the American intellectual tradition such as James H. Kloppenberg of Harvard University, who is himself a Catholic but he was not educated in Catholic higher education, do not appear to consider the work of American Catholics in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to be part of the American intellectual tradition. In short, the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that flourished in American Catholic higher education for most of the twentieth century was not part of American prestige culture at the time, not has it received much acknowledgment and recognition by scholars of American intellectual history at non-Catholic universities. However, out of the Old World orientation of American Catholics arose John Courtney Murray, S.J., an American Jesuit who was instrumental in moving the Roman Catholic Church to recognize religious freedom officially at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). Prior to going to Harvard University for his doctoral studies in English, Ong had been educated in Catholic educational institutions, receiving three graduate degrees during his Jesuit training from Saint Louis University. No doubt Ong’s Ph.D. from Harvard helped make him credible in American prestige culture in his day. In addition, Ong’s doctoral dissertation about the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572) involved American studies, because Perry Miller, who served as the director of Ong’s dissertation, had established in The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (XII.100) that virtually all college-educated New Englanders in the seventeenth century had been Ramists. As a result, Ong’s far more thorough study of Ramus and Ramism contributed to American studies, which under the influence of Perry Miller was emerging in American prestige culture as an important field of study. Thus Ong’s doctoral dissertation contributed to his credibility in American prestige culture in his day. For a perceptive survey of the influence of Kant and Hegel on modern Protestant theology, see Gary Dorrien’s Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology (XII.27).


(III.77) Gregg, Richard B. “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 4 (1971): 71-91. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Also see Erikson (X.16a); L. J. Friedman (X.22a: 243-302); Grimaldi (I.76); Ong (III.140; XII.126). In *Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson* (X.22a), Lawrence J. Friedman perceptively discusses “Voice and Authenticity: The 1950s” (243-302). His discussion of how voice can be connected with a new level of authenticity and forcefulness (281) is centrally relevant to Richard B. Gregg’s discussion of the ego-function of protest rhetoric and also to Ong’s thesis about the psychodynamics of agonistic structures (III.140; XII.126). Actually, Ong’s own personal experience of the breakthrough in his thinking in the early 1950s can be understood as an example showing how he himself found his voice as a scholar and a new level of authenticity and forcefulness – see, for example, Ong (I.142).


(III.78a) Habermas, Jurgen. *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*. Trans. Ciarin Cronin. Cambridge, UK; and Malden, MA: Polity P, 2008. Topics: History of Philosophy; Cultural Studies. In the philosophical essays in this collection, Jurgen Habermas works with the contrast of so-called naturalism and so-called religion. By so-called naturalism, he means the worldview of visuality and modernity in print culture in Western culture, which he characterizes as post-metaphysical. By contrast, he characterizes so-called religion as involving metaphysical thought. But because Habermas is not familiar with Ong’s groundbreaking work regarding the infrastructures of our Western cultural conditioning, and because Habermas evidently also is not familiar with Lonergan’s groundbreaking book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30),
Habermas fails to examine the cultural conditioning in Western culture that produced the post-metaphysical bias that he obviously endorses, just as he fails to consider the alternative approach to metaphysical thought that Lonergan proposes. However, in my estimate, the post-metaphysical bias that Habermas obviously defends needs to be revisited and corrected. Also see Farrell (III.48); Nagel (III.125a); Ong (XII.124: 61-82); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Teilhard (II.21).

(III.78b) Hajdin, Mane. The Law of Sexual Harassment: A Critique. Selengrove: Susquehanna UP; London: Associated U Presses, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).


(III.84) Homer. The Iliad of Homer. Trans. and introduction Richmond Lattimore. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1951. It is extremely important to note that Iliad is not structured as a struggle of good guys versus bad guys. For example, Hector and Andromache are admirable compared to the Agamemnon and Achilles in the opening scene, in which the goddess Athena needs to physically restrain the powerful Achilles from dispatching Agamemnon and instruct him (Achilles) to give Agamemnon a good tongue lashing instead, which Achilles proceeds to do. In any event, the story about the seemingly endless war in Troy conveys the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like an endless war or struggle (Greek, polemos). In Christianity, the sense of life as a moral struggle or war is thematized by teaching Christians that they should be prepared to die for their religious faith. In Islam, the sense of life as a struggle or war is thematized in the term “jihad.”
III.85 ---. The Odyssey of Homer. Trans. and an introduction Richmond Lattimore. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. The story of Odysseus can be understood as conveying the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like a never-ending contest or struggle (Greek, agon).


III.91 Janney, Peter. Mary’s Mosaic: The CIA Conspiracy to Murder John F. Kennedy, Mary Pinchot Meyer, and Their Vision of World Peace. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012. Topics: American Studies; JFK Assassination; Hallucinogens. Also see Carroll (III.22); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); Douglass (III.42); Huxley (I.87a); Masters and Houston (I.108a); Nelson (III.127b); H. Smith (I.168a); Stone (III.161c); Wills (III.122). Unfortunately, it is not unheard of that a husband dumped and divorced by
his wife might kill her and perhaps also might kill her lover. But if he’s Cord Meyer, Jr., he might leave it up to his buddies to kill his wife’s lover and then his wife. Cord Meyer, Jr., had buddies who were professional assassins. He and his buddies worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA (which probably should be referred to as the Central Intelligence Assassins). In his book *Mary’s Mosaic*, Peter Janney shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Cord Meyer’s CIA buddies assassinated his former wife, Mary Pinchot Meyer. In addition, Peter Janney shows beyond a reasonable doubt that his own father, Wistar Janney, a high-ranking CIA official, participated in the assassination of Mary Pinchot Meyer. If Wistar Janney’s participation in the assassination of Mary Pinchot Meyer were not troubling enough for Peter Janney to deal with, wait until you read the rest of the story. For young Peter’s closest childhood friend was one of Mary and Cord Meyer’s sons, who was tragically killed by an oncoming car when he was trying to cross a busy highway. So through his father, Peter Janney probably knew all the high-ranking CIA officials that he discusses in this book as well as Mary Pinchot Meyer. It has been well established that Mary Meyer was one of President John F. Kennedy’s lovers. However, it is not well known that Mary kept a diary. In it, she presumably would have recorded information about how she had turned President Kennedy on to LSD. In James W. Douglass’ book *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why he Died and Why It Matters* (III.42), Douglass uses conceptual constructs from Roman Catholic theology to hypothesize an explanation of how and why JFK changed during his years as president. Surprise, surprise, LSD can prompt people to change. According to Peter Janney, Mary Meyer believed firmly in the power of LSD as an agent of personal change. As a result, she organized a small group of women to try to get powerful men in Washington to try LSD. She herself undertook to get JFK to try LSD. Evidently, he did take LSD under her guidance. As Peter Janney explains, she herself had been turned on to LSD by Timothy Leary and had learned from him how to guide others in taking LSD. As Douglass has shown in his book, powerful people in government and government-related businesses certainly had a motive to assassinate President Kennedy. As is well known, the CIA certainly had the means to assassinate President Kennedy. As Peter Janney explains, about one month after President Kennedy’s assassination, former President Harry S. Truman published an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* sharply criticizing the CIA. As Peter Janney points out, evidently, Truman had figured out that the CIA had been involved in President Kennedy’s assassination. As Peter Janney reports, Mary Meyer had a home-delivery subscription to the *Post*. But did she see Truman’s piece? In any event, she did later see the work of fiction known as the Warren Commission Report. Unfortunately for her, she made the mistake of confronting her former husband about the Warren Commission cover-up. Peter Janney indicates that she may have also confronted James Jesus Angleton of the CIA about the Warren Commission cover-up. The CIA arranged to assassinate her in
order to silence her. In an elaborate scenario orchestrated by the CIA, she was shot at close range twice by a professional assassin. After she had been assassinated, Angleton himself also arranged to get his hands on her diary and take it. Just as Harvey Lee Oswald was set up to be the patsy for President Kennedy’s assassination, so too an African American man named Raymond Crump, Jr., was set up to be the patsy for Mary Pinchot Meyer’s assassination. But the prosecution had a weak case – only minimal circumstantial evidence against Crump. His skillful defense attorney, an African American woman named Dovey J. Roundtree, succeeded in inspiring the jurors with sufficient reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s case to win his acquittal. So when Peter Janney was a young boy, his best friend was killed by an automobile. Then when Peter Janney was a teenager in high school at a private boarding school, his best friend’s mother was murdered. Later in his life, Peter Janney learned that his best friend’s father’s CIA buddies arranged to have his best friend’s mother murdered and that his own father in the CIA, Wistar Janney, had participated in the execution of her murder. If you’ve read the longer version of William Faulkner’s story “The Bear,” you may be in a position to imagine the enormity of those tragic events in Peter Janney’s life. Frankly, it is a wonder that he has written such a remarkably lucid account of all those tragic events.


(III.93) Jenkins, Philip. Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of the Eighties. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Perceptive. Topic: American Studies. Also see Cox (XII.22a); Bottum (III.12a); Dorrien (III.40; III.41); Douglass (III.42); Duberman (III.30); Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56); L. J. Friedman (X.22c); Greenberg (XII.56); Hale (III.79); Heath and Potter (III.80); Janney (III.91); Kurlansky (III.111); Levin (III.111d); Linker (III.111e); Masters and Houston (I.108a); O’Malley (XII.109); Ong (III.133; XII.121a); Skinner (XII.155a); Steinfels (III.161a); J. Walsh (III.170); Wills (XII.168). In this admirable work Philip Jenkins sets for a perceptive interpretation of movement conservatism in American culture. Movement conservatism in American culture had its roots in the 1950s. For example, William F. Buckley’s ridiculous book God and Man at Yale (Chicago: Regnery, 1950) helped launch movement conservatism in American culture. But the excesses of various movements associated with the 1960s, including the excesses of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s so-called Great Society initiatives, proved to be the greatest boon bestowed on movement conservatism in American culture. Jenkins captures the spirit aptly be characterizing the spirit as anti-60s. For the anti-1960s crowd, the 1960s are associated not only with President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, but also with both the black
civil rights movement that gained momentum in the 1950s and the
women’s movement that emerged in the 1970s. For good measure, the
anti-1960s crowd also includes in their expanded sense of the 1960s the
Supreme Court decision in the 1970s to legalize abortion. The anti-1960s
crowd has gotten enormous mileage out of their reactionary anti-1960s
spirit. Their anti-1960s spirit exemplifies the psychodynamic that Ong in
his book *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness* (III.134)
refers to as the sense of adversativeness – as feeling up against something.
Through targeting various targets to be up against, their sense of
adversativeness has allowed them to establish as strong sense of an in-
group versus and out-group. Ong has also discussed this tendency of
forming an in-group and an out-group in his perceptive essay “The
Barbarian Within: Outsiders Inside Society Today” (see item III.133). For
the anti-1960s crowd, the 1960s symbolically represent the barbarians
inside American society today – to use Öng’s figurative way of speaking.
But I would reconfigure the way that the anti-1960s crowd aligns their
sense of the in-group and the out-group. The long-standing historical
configuration of the in-group in American prestige culture has been
described as WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant). Because WASPS
constituted the in-group historically in American culture, non-WASPS
were lumped together as the out-group historically. However, when
Harvard-educated Senator John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Vice
President Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, his election
marked a sharp departure from WASP dominance in American prestige
culture, because he was neither Anglo-Saxon nor Protestant. Moreover,
even if he was motivated by pragmatic political considerations, he
supported the black civil rights movement. In doing this and in other ways,
JFK earned the wrath of the guardians of WASP hegemony in American
prestige culture. As a result, JFK was assassinated by some of the
guardians of WASP hegemony. Now, the black civil rights leader the
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was very skilled in tempting white
supremacists who were local guardians of WASP hegemony to overplay
their hands in opposing his civil rights demonstrations. When they did
overplay their hands, their reactionary efforts were photographed by the
media and reported on the evening news in the living rooms of Americans
across the country. At first blush, MLK’s strategies in tempting local
guardians of WASP hegemony to overplay their hands may look like an
exercise on his part if staging adversativeness. To be sure, he was staging
adversativeness. However, he preached a message of non-violence. As a
result, MLK represents the use of adversativeness in the service of non-
violence. In a similar way, the demonstrations of the emerging
contemporary women’s movement also represent the use of
adversativeness in the service of non-violence. However, violence
emerged when MLK was assassinated in 1968 and later when presidential
candidate Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1968. There was
also the violence of the riots in Los Angeles, and the violence of the police
at the time of the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968. Nevertheless, MLK’s commitment to the spirit of non-violence is instructive. David Bakan (III.6) and Vicki S. Helgeson (III.81) work with the contrast of agency versus communion, a contrast they see as a deep divide in the human psyche. The spirit that Ong describes as involving a sense of adversativeness usually accompanies agency, including the efforts in favor of agency made through public political demonstrations. But certain public political demonstrations can be carried out in the larger political spirit of communion. Because African Americans had been part of the out-group that was created historically through WASP hegemony in American prestige culture, the black civil rights movement associated with MLK’s spirit of non-violence can be understood as attempting to cultivate the larger political spirit of communion, at least with respect to public laws and customs (for example, the Jim Crow laws and customs). In certain respects, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant women had been the beneficiaries of WASP hegemony in American prestige culture historically. But certain white Anglo-Saxon Protestant women nevertheless joined the women’s movement that emerged in the 1970s. Self-styled feminists in the 1970s and later cultivated their sense of adversativeness by standing up to and denouncing male chauvinists, including of course white male chauvinists. No doubt their basic criticisms of male chauvinists were well founded, just as African American criticisms of Jim Crow laws and customs were well founded. However, as was the case with the criticisms of Jim Crow laws and customs, many of the criticisms advanced by feminists in the 1970s and later were aimed at advancing their sense of communion, at least communion within the larger political domains in American prestige culture. But Jenkins correctly notes that the anti-1960s crowd capitalized on the excesses of the black civil rights movement and the women’s movement to rally conservatives around their cause of resisting the excesses. Good riddance to the excesses. But are anti-1960s conservatives ever going to give up their resistance to the worthwhile advances that the black civil rights movement and the women’s movement helped bring about in American prestige culture?

(III.94) ---. *Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe for the Next 1,500 Years*. New York: HarperOne, 2010. Accessible. Topics: Church History; Cultural Studies. Also see Cox (XII.22a); Farrell (I.61).

(III.95) ---. *The New Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice*. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Topic: American Studies. Also see Massa (III.118). Political correctness dominates certain academic and media circles today. But political correctness has not yet ruled out public expressions of anti-Catholic attitudes in the United States. However, we should take into account the public roles of conservative American Catholics in their anti-
abortion zealotry. Incited by the religious zealotry of Pope John-Paul II and certain American Catholic bishops and priests, conservatives American Catholics have crusaded against legalized abortion in the first trimester. In light of their crusade against legalized abortion in the first trimester, Americans who support legalized abortion in the first trimester, many of whom could be described as the political correctness police in academia and the media, might understandably want to express invective against the Catholic anti-abortion zealots. Unfortunately, however, the public expression in the United States today of invective against Catholics calls to mind the centuries-old Protestant tradition in American culture of anti-Catholic invective and indeed of historical anti-Catholic prejudice. From colonial times onward, Protestants, by definition, celebrated the fact that they were not Catholic by being explicitly and overtly anti-Catholic. In response, American Catholics historically were anti-Protestant, or at least wary of American Protestants and American Protestant culture and practices. American Protestants historically represented the New World. By contrast, American Catholics historically tended to represent the Old World, because the Roman Catholic tradition of thought developed historically in the Old World of Continental Europe. In any event, over the centuries of American culture, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were the gatekeepers of prestige culture in American culture. Because of the strong anti-Catholic prejudice of WASPs, American Catholics historically developed their own parallel subculture in American culture, which certain Catholic sociologists have described as a ghetto culture. By and large, the broad trend in philosophy known as American pragmatism did not make any notable inroads in the American Catholic subculture, or ghetto. Conversely, the formidable Catholic tradition of thought did not make any notable inroads in the prestige culture in American culture dominated by American Protestants historically. Now, even if we were to cavalierly write off the formidable Catholic tradition of thought (e.g., the Catholic tradition of natural-law moral theory) as representing the Old World of pre-modern thought of Continental Europe as by definition unsuitable to being assimilated in the New World of modern thought of American prestige culture and its commitments to modernity, we should also note that Bernard Lonergan’s philosophical masterpiece *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (X.30) has not yet made inroads in American prestige culture. At least with regard to Lonergan’s *Insight* (1957), American prestige culture appears to be a closed-system of thought that has closed out Lonergan. Now, when we turn our attention from Lonergan to Ong, we should note that Ong’s Harvard doctoral dissertation was published in two volumes by Harvard University Press in 1958, Ong’s Terry Lectures at Yale were published by Yale University Press in 1967, and Ong had three important books published by Cornell University Press (in 1971, 1977, and 1981). To this day, Ong is the only Roman Catholic priest to have ever been elected president of the Modern Language Association (he served as MLA president in 1978). So he was not closed
out of American prestige culture, as Lonergan was. Nevertheless, Ong’s thought has not made deep inroads in American prestige culture, just as Lonergan’s thought in *Insight* has not. Why not? At least in part, Ong’s thought and Lonergan’s thought in *Insight* have probably not made deep inroads in American prestige culture because centuries-old anti-Catholic bias in American culture has worked against the assimilation of their admittedly challenging thought. However, apart from the possibility of Ong’s thought and Lonergan’s thought perhaps making inroads in American prestige culture, I would like to see more American authors criticize Roman Catholic moral theology. I have studied Roman Catholic moral theology, and I think it is open to question, to say the least (e.g., no masturbation, no artificial contraception, no legalized abortion in the first trimester, no divorce, no re-marriage after civil divorce, no communion for divorced Catholics, no same-sex marriage, no women priests, no married priests, no euthanasia, no physician-assisted suicide, no death penalty, etc.). In my estimate, Paul Blanshard (XII.11; XII.12; XII.13) in his day correctly criticized the Roman Catholic Church for certain questionable teachings. Today we in American culture need more Paul Blanshards to take on in public debate the questionable moral teachings of Roman Catholic moral doctrines doggedly advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies. Please do not misunderstand me here. I am not talking about simply directing invective toward the U.S. Catholic bishops or toward American Catholics more generally. Nor am I talking about simply making heartfelt denunciations of particular Catholic teachings. What this country needs now is informed pro-and-con public debate about Catholic moral teachings. In the name of being “prophetic,” certain U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies have entered the arena of public discourse and civic debate. However, in my estimate, nobody has effectively joined the debate against them. Let me explain briefly what I mean by saying this. In our law courts, the prosecuting attorney stands to say, “The accused is guilty as charged.” Then the defense attorney stands to say, “No, the accused is not guilty as charged.” In this way, the defense attorney formally joins the debate against the prosecuting attorney. Now, in addition to formally joining the debate against the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney must stand ready to criticize the prosecution’s case against the accused step by step. Now, by analogy, informed pro-and-con debate against the teachings of the U.S. Catholic bishops and their allies should involve criticizing the entire theoretical scaffolding for their teachings. Granted, all moral reasoning involves using conceptual constructs and predications. But when was the last time that the Editorial Board of the *New York Times* examined and criticized in detail the moral reasoning advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops in an editorial? In addition to publishing editorials by the Editorial Board, the *Times* also regularly publishes essays by academics in philosophy in its feature known as “The Stone.” But when was the last time an informed critique of Catholic moral reasoning was published in “The Stone”? I know, I know,
if a critique were to be published in “The Stone,” then Catholics might want equal time for an author to present the Catholic viewpoint as an installment of “The Stone.” But this kind of statement versus counter-statement would involve pro-and-con debate, which is what I am advocating here. Apart from the various critiques published by the practicing Catholic and public intellectual Garry Wills, the moral teachings advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops have not been subjected to informed public debate and criticism. Now, when certain Catholic bishops and their allies enter the public arena of debate about admittedly moral issues, they see themselves as being “prophetic.” In American culture we have a long-standing Protestant tradition known as the American jeremiad. But American jeremiads have usually been debated in informed and spirited pro-and-con debate. So, apart from Garry Wills, why is there not more informed and spirited pro-and-con debate about the moral reasoning advanced by the U.S. Catholic bishops and their lay allies? Or will it be the case that the leaders of American prestige culture will circle the wagons and close off American prestige culture from any meaningful debate with the pre-modern thought-world of Roman Catholicism, including Catholic natural-law moral theory, so that American Catholics will therefore continue to live forever in an American Catholic subculture, or ghetto, or counter-culture? Or will it be the case that U.S. Catholic bishops will circle the wagons and close off American Catholics from the influence of American prestige culture, which tends to be secular in its orientation today – and at times, even anti-religious?


(III.105) Josephus, Flavius. *Against Apion: Translation and Commentary*. Ed. and Trans. John M. G. Barclay. Leiden, Netherlands; and Boston: Brill, 2013. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Nirenberg (III.128f). Good source of information about ancient anti-Jewish invective.


Kilmartin, Christopher and Julie A. Allison. *Men’s Violence Against Women: Theory, Research, and Activism*. Mahwah, NJ; and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see N. Ellis (III.44a); Felson (III.49); Houston (XII.72b); Jacoby (III.90a). In his famous dystopian novel *Brave New World* (1935), Aldous Huxley portrays the assembly-line reproduction of the human race in carefully monitored bottles. In this way, future science will liberate women from bearing children and thereby free them up for lives of sex, sex, sex. If and when women no longer bear children, there will probably no longer be any violence against women by men. However, as long as women continue to bear children, men’s violence against women will probably continue -- unfortunately. Because women bear children, the mother looms large in the psyches of all children. But male children tend to work to separate themselves psychologically from the powerful and at times seemingly overpowering feminine image in their psyches. In *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness* (III.134). Ong makes three interrelated claims that are important for understanding the male identity crisis in the United States today: (1) He claims that human males have a psychological need to work out and establish a distinctively masculine identity. (2) He claims that human males suffer from a distinct male insecurity, which is not the same as the insecurity that girls and women have. In other words, the distinct male insecurity requires the formation of a distinctively masculine identity, because the distinct male insecurity grows out of the overpowering image of the feminine in the psyche and out of the fact that only women bear children – men don’t. (3) He also claims human males have to work out a distinctively masculine identity in the context of other males, not in the context of their mothers or sisters or lovers or wives. So male agonistic behavior give rise to rivalry and competitiveness – usually involving other males as the real or imagined adversaries. Historically, as Arnold Van Gennep (III.166) shows, many cultures over the centuries devised male puberty rites to help young males at the age of puberty to work out a way to separate themselves psychologically from the overwhelming power of the feminine image in their psyches. Male puberty rites involved all-male cohorts in certain activities structured by older males, not by females. As Ong (III.136) shows, understanding the spirit of the male puberty rite can deepen our understanding of how Latin language instruction served as a male puberty rite. However, male puberty rites resulted at times in suicides. Suicides are the downside of male puberty rites. For this reason, I do not
recommend any attempt to resurrect male puberty rites. As to sublimated forms of the male puberty rite, we can point to boot camp in the armed services and to novitiate experiences in the religious orders in the Roman Catholic Church such as the all-male Jesuit order, which has a two-year novitiate and a later novitiate-like third year that is known in Jesuit parlance as tertianship. Other forms of all-male groups no doubt help provide socially acceptable ways in which boys and men could get together and cultivate the spirit of the specifically masculine identity that Ong claims that human males need to cultivate. However, at the present time, the culturally conditioned components of specifically masculine identity are undergoing understandable scrutiny for signs of white racism and male sexism. This understandable scrutiny has been prompted by recent advances by African Americans and other minorities, challenging the centuries-old American tradition of white supremacy, and by the women’s movement generally, challenging the even older tradition of male supremacy over women. Even though the legal, educational, and cultural advances by minorities and by women in recent decades in the United States are welcome and long overdue, those advances understandably challenge certain old components of the specifically masculine identity that has dominated American culture over the centuries – components based on white supremacy and on male supremacy. As a result, the old masculine identity is breaking down, so that a new masculine identity can break through. In effect, the masculine identity crisis in American culture today involves men living through the ancient Egyptian myth of Osiris. In the ancient myth of Osiris, which Normandi Ellis (III.44a) has ably translated, his sister puts the scattered parts of his dismembered body back together, except for a certain symbolic part. Out of his reconstructed body, the higher masculine identity emerges. Something like this reconstructive process is underway in our contemporary American culture. The old masculine identity has been deconstructed and dismembered. Now reconstruction must occur for the higher masculine identity to emerge and flourish. However, for the emergence of the new higher masculine identity to emerge and flourish, men will have to work out a win-win situation with women, so that in effect women also experience the emergence of the new higher masculinity in their own psychological development. So we need to have the new higher masculinity emerge for both men and women, because the new higher masculinity represents the optimal human psychological growth and development of human agency and flow as well as the spirit of communion – and of individuation and ego-integrity. This is the goal. In any event, when we turn our attention to men’s violence against women, we can extrapolate from Ong’s claim and say that the men involved in violence against women probably do not have a strong and secure masculine identity. Let’s consider three broad kinds of men’s violence against women. (1) Physical violence. Lacking a strong and secure masculine identity, certain men can feel threatened by women and respond
violently. (2) Rape of women unknown by the rapists. In many cases of
sexual violence, it is hard to understand how the women made the rapists
feel threatened. In such cases, the rapists most likely feel threatened by the
powerful feminine image in their psyches. (3) Date rape. But in cases of
date rape, the rapists usually know the women they rape, at least to some
extent. Those rapists are not going to take “No” for an answer. As a result,
they overpower their victims and rape them. In these three kinds of men’s
violence against women, we see men using physical strength and violence
to overpower women. At some level, the powerful image of the feminine
in the psyches of those men is threatening them. They are countering the
powerful threat they feel from the image of the feminine in their psyches
by acting out violently against women. In short, they are using power
against women because they feel threatened by the powerful image of the
feminine in their psyches. Let’s review. Because human males are born of
women, the mother looms large in the human psyche. As a result, boys
and men need to work out age-appropriate ways to establish a specifically
masculine sense of identity to counteract against the powerful image of
the feminine in their psyches. However, the powerful image of the
feminine in their psyches can be complicated by their own personal
experiences of their mothers and by patriarchal cultural arrangements and
attitudes. For example, some mothers abuse their power over their
children. Such abuse can complicate the psychological lives of their
children. But Ong’s claim about the need of human males to establish a
sense of specifically masculine identity suggests that the only way that we
as a culture can hope to combat men’s violence against women is to help
men work out and establish a strong sense of masculine identity. Our
human identities usually involve our identifications. For example, most
boys and men identify with their fathers and other father figures in their
lives. In addition, most boys and men identify with certain age-appropriate
masculine role models. Now, it is not uncommon for boys and men to
experience disillusionment at times with some of the boys and men with
whom they had identified, including their fathers. It is not pleasant to
experience this kind of disillusionment. It is an experience that we need to
mourn. Nevertheless, after we have become disillusioned with certain
identifications we have made, we need to avoid throwing out the bath
water with the baby. Instead of throwing out the bath water with the baby,
we should try to give credit where credit is due to our fathers and other
male role models with whom we have identified. I mentioned mourning.
There are two different kinds of mourning: (1) mourning the death of a
loved one (also known as bereavement); and (2) mourning nondeath losses
in our lives. Disillusionment with somebody we have admired and
identified with involves mourning a nondeath loss. All nondeath losses
involve experiencing abandonment feelings. For this reason, Susan
Anderson’s *The Journey from Abandonment to Healing* (X.3) can serve as
a guide for mourning all nondeath losses. Failed mourning of nondeath
loss can lead men to violence at times, both suicide and violence against
others. Of course women can also experience failed mourning of nondeath loss, leadings at times to suicide and violence against other. In conclusion, I have suggested that Ong’s three interrelated claims can help us better understand certain aspects of men’s violence against women. However enlightening Ong’s thought may be for us, no easy solutions to the problems of men’s violence against women readily emerge from his perceptive thought. Nevertheless, Ong’s thought provides a useful and instructive framework for considering possible solutions to the problems of men’s violence against women. As odd as it may sound in this context, I would note here that Jean Houston (XII.72b) has recently called attention to how the 1939 Hollywood movie The Wizard of Oz, starring 16-year-old Judy Garland as Dorothy, contains mythic elements so that it resembles the psychodynamics of a puberty rite. With the 75th anniversary of this musical coming up in 2014, perhaps a campaign could be organized to get American teenagers to view it and then discuss Dorothy and her three companions. Perhaps the ever-clever Jean Houston could write up a series of discussion questions to be published as an appendix in a new paperback edition of her book about the movie. We are clearly in a position where trial and error will be the only way to proceed to try to work out new approaches to puberty rites for American teenagers. However, American culture today needs more fundamental fixing than what effective substitutes for puberty rites could possibly provide. The more fundamental fixing should include fixing the economic system and related issues.

(III.108) King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. Ed. Clayborne Carson. New York and Boston: Grand Central Publishing, 1998. Topics: American Studies; American Protestant Spirituality. Also see Burrow (X.9); Colby (III.28a); Farrell (VII.8); Hansen (VII.10a); King (III.108a); Mieder (VII.17); K. D. Miller (VII.18). In my junior year at Saint Louis University, I heard Dr. King speak on campus on Monday afternoon, October 12, 1964. Evidently, he was the first Baptist minister ever allowed to speak publicly on a Jesuit campus. On October 14, 1964, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In the spring semester I traveled by chartered bus with some other college students from the St. Louis area to join Dr. King’s march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, where I heard him speak on March 25, 1965.


(III.109) Kinzer, Stephen. The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2013. Topic: American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Sherry (X.44c). Media coverage recently reminded us that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. The conspirators set up Lee
Harvey Oswald as the patsy to take the blame for the assassination. Next, they had Jack Ruby kill Oswald to silence him. Most likely the conspirators included certain disgruntled guys in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. In *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*, Stephen Kinzer shows the extensive experience that the CIA had in instigating destabilization and regime-change efforts abroad. For example, he carefully details their destabilizing efforts in Iran (119–46), Guatemala (147–74), Vietnam (175–215), Indonesia (216–46), the Congo (247-83), and Cuba (284-307). Foster and Allen Dulles were lawyers, not plutocrats. But they became wealthy by doing legal work for plutocrats. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s, Foster served as Secretary of State; Allen, as the director of the CIA. In effect, Kinzer deepens our understanding of the American civic religion in the 1950s. However, he does not happen to use the term civic religion. Nevertheless, Kinzer in effect explains that the American civic religion was decidedly anti-communist in the 1950s. But President Kennedy violated the American civic religion that had directed the CIA’s various destabilization campaigns in different countries in the 1950s. Now, from colonial times onward, the majority of Americans had been Protestants. In addition, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) had dominated the prestige culture in American culture. But Senator John A. Kennedy’s narrow victory in the 1960 presidential election marked the first time that a Roman Catholic had been elected president of the United States. However, even though he was a Roman Catholic, he had been educated in WASP educational institutions – most notably Harvard. During the presidential campaign, he sounded like a fervent anti-communist, as did other Democrats and Republicans at the time. At that time, the Roman Catholic Church was also officially anti-communist, because the communists were officially anti-religion. In other words, both the Roman Catholic Church and the American civic religion were officially anti-communist. But that is not all that the American civic religion involved in the 1950s. It also involved a strong belief in American capitalism. Kinzer quotes Foster Dulles as making the following statement: ‘‘For us there are two kinds of people in the world,’ Foster once said. ‘There are those who are Christians and support free enterprise, and there are the others’’ (320-21). Us vs. Them. As we will see, fear was the motivating force behind “us.” As we will also see, no neutrality was allowed. But at that time, the Roman Catholic Church did not officially “support free enterprise,” as Foster Dulles understood this. Thus there was a difference between the official position of the Roman Catholic Church at that time and the position espoused by Foster Dulles. Now, in his first papal exhortation, Pope Francis recently criticized capitalism. If Foster Dulles were alive today to read the pope’s criticisms of capitalism, he would no doubt declare that the pope is not one of “us” because he does not “support free enterprise,” but instead criticizes it. Now, in *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for*
Justice (IX.55a), Martha Nussbaum, who describes herself as an Aristotelian, defends the role and importance of political emotions in general and love in particular. Political emotions help people to come together to form political alliances. In Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender (III.110), Barbara Koziak explains the importance of the part of the psyche known in Greek as thumos (or thymos) in motivating people to take political action together. Now, during the experiment in participatory democracy of male citizens in ancient Athens, Aristotle observed in his treatise on Rhetoric that civic orators made three kinds of appeals to their audiences: (1) logos (reason), (2) pathos (emotion), and (3) ethos (identity, asking their fellow Athenians to identify with them). In our American experiment in representative democracy, candidates for elective office and government officials usually still make these three kinds of appeals to their fellow Americans: (1) logos, (2) pathos, and (3) ethos (identity, asking their fellow Americans to identify with them). As Kinzer explains, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia had inspired fear in President Woodrow Wilson and other Western leaders at the Paris Peace conference in 1918-1919 at the end of World War I, which the Dulles brothers participated in (32). During the Cold War, the pathos component was fear – fear of the Soviet Union, and fear of world-wide communism supposedly directed by Moscow. The ethos component was based on being loyal Americans. In the midst of anti-communist hysteria in the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy, himself a Roman Catholic from Wisconsin, excelled in denouncing supposedly un-American people in the American government. No American wanted to be suspected of being “un-American.” This accusation usually meant that the accused person did not believe fervently in the American representative democratic government and/or American capitalism. The accused could even be suspected of being a spy. Kinzer suggests that the Dulles brothers and President Eisenhower in the 1950s were determined to wage their global war against communism because they were “reassured by a diffuse, supra-rational assumption that American power must always prevail in the end” (297). I refer to this kind of supra-rational assumption as the American civic religion. Kinzer claims that Foster and Allen Dulles “were shaped by missionary Calvinism and America’s pioneer tradition, believed that godly and satanic forces were at war on earth, and felt called to crush the satanic ones” (227). Elsewhere, Kinzer quotes Max Weber to explain the sharp binary of good versus evil that the Dulles brothers worked with: “They assimilated what the sociologist Max Weber described as two fundamental Calvinist tenets: that Christians are ‘weapons in the hands of God and executors of His providential will’ and that ‘God’s glory demanded that the reprobate be compelled to submit to the law of the church’” (115-16). So for Foster and Allen, the Cold War was really a holy war. Because the communists were officially opposed to religion, their official position reinforced the sense that the Dulles brothers and many other anti-communist Americans had
that the Cold War was a holy war. In the view of the Dulles brothers and President Eisenhower, neutrality was not an acceptable option for non-communist nations around the world. In other words, communism was supposed to be the common enemy of all non-communist nations in the world. With the full collaboration of President Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers geared up the CIA for a wide range of dark arts, including destabilizing unacceptable regimes. For example, with President Eisenhower’s approval, the CIA planned the invasion of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. But the invasion was carried out in 1961 after President John F. Kennedy had taken office and had approved it. It turned out to be a disaster. As a result of that debacle, President Kennedy subsequently relieved Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of their CIA positions. (Kinzer claims that Allen Dulles had serious health issues for months before Kennedy relieved him of his CIA position.) Kinzer carefully details how President Eisenhower had acted over the years regarding various CIA operations. Kinzer suggests that Richard Bissell, who was primarily responsible for the invasion plan, had most likely expected President Kennedy to supply air cover for the invasion, as President Eisenhower almost certainly would have. But did Kennedy’s later removal of Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell prompt certain disgruntled CIA officials to assassinate Kennedy -- bringing then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson into their conspiracy to handle the cover-up afterward? Kinzer does not explore this possibility. However, he could have explored this possibility in at least general terms. Let me explain. In his fine book JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters (III.42), James W. Douglass suggests that JFK was assassinated because he was a peacenik in a government in which peaceniks were not over-represented, to put it mildly. As Douglass has detailed, President Kennedy stands as a decided contrast with Foster and Allen Dulles – as detailed by Kinzer. For example, JFK’s attitudes toward the Soviet Union, Cuba, Latin America in general, Africa in general, and Indonesia stand in sharp contrast with the views of the Dulles brothers and of the CIA. According to Douglass, President Kennedy was using back channels to explore avenues of peace with Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Neither the Joint Chiefs nor the CIA would have welcomed President Kennedy’s peace overtures with Khrushchev and Castro. Instead of using President Kennedy’s policies as points of contrast with the policies of the Dulles brothers, Kinzer works with a polemical framework. Here’s how Kinzer sums up his concern about the Dulles brothers: “Their actions frame the grand debate over America’s role in the world that has never been truly joined in the United States” (327). So what does it mean for a debate to be joined? In a criminal trial in the United States, the prosecuting attorney claims that the defendant is guilty as charged. The defense attorney then claims, “No, he (or she) is not guilty as charged.” This is an example of how a debate is joined. Now, in a criminal trial, the prosecuting attorney could charge the defendant with more than
one crime. The defense attorney could join the debate by declaring charge by charge that the defendant is not guilty of any of the charges. So what, exactly, is “the grand debate over America’s role in the world that has never been truly joined in the United States” – according to Kinzer? He says, “Many Americans still celebrate their country’s [supposedly] providential ‘exceptionalism’” (328). But how many Americans today still celebrate our country’s supposedly providential exceptionalism? Granted, certain conservatives do. But the Republican candidate for president did not emerge victorious in 2012. According to Kinzer, this supposed exceptionalism involves “the view that the United States is inherently more moral and farther-seeing than other countries and therefore may behave in ways that others should not” (3). But Kinzer also claims that there is a related “belief that because of its immense power, the United States can not only topple governments but guide the course of history” (3). In theory, the debate about the role of the United States in the world could involve all the key points identified by Kinzer. However, I suspect that the grand debate about the role of the United States in the world is not ever going to be joined. In other words, I do not expect that there will ever be a grand debate. After all, President George W. Bush had a sharp bipolar view of the world that clearly resembled the sharp bipolar view of the anti-communist Americans such as the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower. Moreover, President George W. Bush used his bipolar view of the world to launch his regime change against Saddam Hussein in Iraq – based on the fear that Saddam allegedly had weapons of mass destruction. As this example shows once again, fear is the culprit. By inciting fear, elected and appointed government officials can help generate hysteria.


(III.110) Kozak, Barbara. *Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2000. Topic: History of Philosophy; Rhetorical Theory. Also see Aristotle (I.10); Farrell (III.46; III.47); Garver (I.72); Grimaldi (I.76); Habermas (XII.61; XII.62); Nussbaum (IX.55a); Ong (III.138); Rehg (III.149; III.150; III.151); Slocane (I.165; III.158; III.159). The part of the human psyche that Plato and Aristotle refer to as *thumos* (usually rendered as the spirited part) is the psychodynamics of what Ong refers to as agonistic behavior and the psychodynamics of our fight/flight/freeze reactions. For all practical purposes, *thumos* as Plato and Aristotle use the term is the equivalent of what Jung and his followers refer to as an archetype (i.e., a deep structure of the psyche). More specifically, *thumos* as Plato and Aristotle use the term is basically identical to what Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette (III.124) refer to as the Warrior archetype. (Moore and Gillette have written a whole book about the Warrior archetype in the male psyche, but
they unequivocally claim that there is also a Warrior archetype in the female psyche.)

(III.110a) Krause, Sharon R. *Liberalism with Honor*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 2002. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Cairns (III.19); McNamee (III.121); Nussbaum (IX.55a).


(III.111a) Landes, David S. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York and London: Norton, 1998. Topics: Economic History; Cultural Studies. Also see Clemens (XII.21a); Farrell (XII.38); Ferguson (XII.42); Huntington (III.88); Landes (IX.39b); Morris (XII.103b); Romney (III.152a).


(III.111c) Lesser, Zachary and Benedict S. Robinson, eds. *Textual Conversations in the Renaissance: Ethics, Authors, Technologies*. Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006. Topics: Early Modern Studies; Cultural Studies; History of Technology. Also see Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.158); Smarr (III.159a).

(III.111d) Levin, Yuval. *The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left*. New York: Basic Books/Perseus Books Group, 2014. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Cultural Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Linker (III.111e); Nussbaum (IX.55a); Sherry (X.44c). Yikes! Yuval Levin’s book *The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left*, based on his 2010 doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, is clearly designed to be a feel-good read for American conservatives and thereby contribute to their recuperation in time to pull out significant victories in the 2014 mid-term elections. However, just as contemporary Republicans are up to no good politically, so too Levin is up to no good in this book, as I will explain momentarily. For understandable reasons, many American progressives and liberals today are probably not as familiar with the political views of Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) as Levin is. As a result, many progressives and liberals today might quickly skip over Levin’s book. But it might be a mistake for them to ignore or underestimate what Levin is up to by giving his fellow American conservatives today a feel-good book to read to bolster their spirits in time for the 2014
mid-term elections. No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about possibly repealing Obamacare – if Republicans can gain enough seats in Congress in the 2014 mid-term elections to over-ride President Obama’s predictable veto. Ah, wouldn’t that be the greatest victory for the Republican obstructionists in Congress? No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about the obstructionist tactics of Republicans in Congress over the last two years. No, there’s not a word in Levin’s book about the Republicans’ efforts to overturn and reverse legalized abortion in the first trimester. No, there’s not a word about outlawing the teaching of evolutionary theory in public secondary education, or about requiring equal time in public education for so-called intelligent-design theory, or about requiring textbooks to advertise that evolutionary theory is a theory, not a fact. As a matter of fact, Levin characterizes Burke as favoring evolution as a model for political change, because Burke clearly does not prefer the kind of political revolution that occurred in the French Revolution. Question: Would supposedly acceptable political evolution resemble the spirit of social Darwinism – dog eat dog, eh? In any event, Levin does not say a word to criticize his fellow conservatives today. Instead, he says something like the following to his fellow conservatives today: “Time out, guys! We’ve got the winning way for American politics to proceed because we American conservatives carry on the spirit of the British conservative Edmund Burke. I’ve studied Burke’s conservative views and Thomas Paine’s radical views. Paine’s radical views resemble in spirit all those radical views today that we conservatives dislike. So we in movement conservatism should refresh our understanding of Burke’s views, because he is the founding father of our movement conservatism. If we re-dedicate ourselves to our founding father’s rationalizations of conservatism, his views will help us prevail in the 2014 mid-term elections and in the 2016 elections.” I am sorry to say that conservative Chicken Littles might just buy into Levin’s set up, because they might find it flattering to buy into Burke’s rationalizations of his conservatism – in the 18th-century British political system, which is significantly different from our American political system in the 21st century. Now, we have all heard about generals who are prepared to fight the last war. If conservative Chicken Littles today buy into Levin’s flattering set up, then they might be equipped to participate in the 18th-century British debate about the French Revolution. But they will not be well prepared to participate in the important debates of our times. The important debates of our times involve our understanding of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and the body of American law. The Declaration of Independence is a philosophical statement. It is a byproduct of 18th-century Enlightenment philosophic thought. It is an idealistic statement. It is a visionary statement. It is a utopian statement. It is a radical statement. It is an extremist statement. So if conservative Chicken Littles denigrate Paine’s thought for being idealistic, visionary, utopian, radical, and extremist, then let them say the same things about the Declaration of
Independence – and then self-deport to Britain, if Britain will accept them. We do not need to have conservative Chicken Littles today re-fighting Burke’s war with Paine. Now, if you look around for a fall guy to replace Paine, you might select Jurgen Habermas and his idealizations for discourse ethics. Granted, certain American academics have read Habermas’s books. Many of his books have been translated from German into English. Habermas’s idealizations for discourse ethics could be characterized as Paine on steroids. But will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to start firing away in the arena of civic debate at Habermas’s idealizations for discourse ethics, instead of firing away at Paine’s 18th-century thought? I doubt it. Or will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to fire away at Paine’s 18th-century thought? For example, will they say, “Paine’s ideas about the rights of man are bunk -- philosophical theory, not fact”? Oh, boy, we have no rights, because Burke and American conservatives like him don’t like Enlightenment philosophical theory, just as certain American conservatives today don’t like evolutionary theory. (I deliberately refer to Burke’s views as his rationalizations because I do not want to suggest that his views are based in philosophical theory. They are not. His rationalizations are just his rules-of-thumb for practical reasoning about political issues.) Or will Levin’s book inspire conservative Chicken Littles today to say, “There you go again – sounding utopian -- just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding utopian – just like the Declaration of Independence”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding radical – just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding radical – just like the Declaration of Independence”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding extremist – just like Paine”? Or to say, “There you go again – sounding extremist – just like the Declaration of Independence”? But perhaps you catch my drift. Levin’s book is designed to make conservatives feel good about being conservatives – just like the British conservative Edmund Burke. In short, Levin’s book is a feel-good book for conservatives. For understandable reasons, conservatives may be feeling a bit down as a result of the 2012 election results. So Levin’s book is designed to make them feel good about being conservatives by reading all of Burke’s rationalizations about his 18th-century conservatism in the British political system. Burke and Paine were among the many authors in the late eighteenth century who published pamphlets in which they debated the American Revolution and the French Revolution. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) was inspired by the debate to write *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) – a work that resonates still in the women’s movement today. Her husband William Godwin (1756-1836) was inspired by the debate to write *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793). So Burke and Paine lived in heady times. Burke and Paine were both British. They were both prolific writers. Neither one of them was a Tory. On the contrary, they were both Whigs. Each considered himself to be a liberal. But Paine participated in both the
American Revolution and the French Revolution – and published a work that helped advance each. Thomas Paine’s pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776) famously helped galvanize sentiment for the American Revolution. His *Rights of Man* (1791), a critique of Burke’s views, supported the French Revolution. However, as Levin notes, late in his life, Paine published a strong critique of Christianity titled *The Age of Reason* (published in three parts in 1794, 1795, 1807). As a result, Protestant preachers at the time denounced him as something like the devil – the Great Satan, as it were. Basically, Paine was a Deist. To this day, because of the predictable backlash to his critique of Christianity, Paine is usually not remembered by most Americans as one of our Founding Fathers. From a distance Burke had supported the American Revolution, but he did not write anything noteworthy about it. However, he was understandably terrified at the thought of something like the French Revolution occurring in his homeland. So he wrote the pamphlet that is known by the short title as *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). But the full title reveals more about the scope of his concerns: *Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings of Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris*. As Levin explains, Burke’s invoked audience of a gentleman in Paris is a charade. Burke is clearly addressing his fellow Brits. In the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, I should give Levin credit for working out a fine comparison and contrast of the thought of these two authors. He has written an informed and readable study in the history of ideas. However, as I’ve indicated, I do not think that he published this book simply to impress us with his scholarship. Instead, he uses his careful historical scholarship to advance movement conservatism in the United States today. Now, the assassination of Julius Caesar was designed to bring about a regime change. It prompted a debate. For example, Cicero wrote a famous defense of the assassination of Julius Caesar – and he subsequently paid the ultimate price for doing so. I would situate Burke’s writings about the French Revolution in the larger context of the debate about Julius Caesar’s assassination and regicide to bring about regime change. I was surprised that Levin did not happen to advert to the body of literature about regicide to bring about regime change. In addition to his scholarly comparison and contrast of the thought of these two authors, Levin makes a claim on our contemporary awareness by suggesting that Burke and Paine somehow represent of the birth of the right and left today. In effect, he proposes that American conservatives today should see Burke as the founding father of movement conservatism and Paine as the founding father of all the ideas that drive American conservatives crazy. In short, the right and the left – as understood by American conservatives. Of course many conservative Chicken Littles today may find Levin’s claim about Burke being their founding father convincing. But I think movement conservatism today is up to no good, which is why I characterize American conservatives today as conservative Chicken Littles. For
understandable reasons, Burke was a reactionary, because he did not want to see a political revolution in England comparable to the French Revolution. Granted, conservative Chicken Littles in the United States today are characteristically reactionaries. All kinds of ideas drive them crazy. But it is a form of flattery for them to imagine that they are somehow carrying on the conservative spirit of Burke. Bunk! They are just a bunch of noisy reactionaries. But Russell Kirk’s book *The Conservative Mind* (Regnery, 1953) helped galvanize movement conservatism that has afflicted American politics and culture for more than a half century now. Kirk championed the British reactionary Edmund Burke as the founding father for movement conservatism. But isn’t it kind of un-American for American conservatives to adopt the British reactionary Edmund Burke as the founding father for movement conservatism? After all, wouldn’t it be more patriotic for American conservatives today to adopt an American as their founding father? Burke was an apologist for the British way of life, including the hereditary monarchy and the hereditary aristocracy – neither of which has existed in the United States. So why do Burke’s views appeal to movement conservatives? This British conservative and American conservatives today tend to have a conservative temperament – temperamentally, they tend to be conservative. So birds of a feather flock together. The basic thrust of Levin’s book about Burke’s views is to help American conservatives today feel good about being conservatives. But if Kirk’s book helped galvanize movement conservatism in the 1950s and 1960s by extolling Burke as its founding father, Levin’s book aims to strengthen movement conservatism today by installing Paine as the great exemplar of all the kinds of ideas that drive conservative Chicken Littles crazy – in effect, the founding father of the left in the United States. From the point of view of conservative Chicken Littles, Levin’s selection of two 18th-century pamphlet writers as the supposedly paradigmatic exemplars of the right and the left today simplifies the thinking of conservative Chicken Littles today enormously. In other words, Levin has supposedly constructed two Procrustean beds for conservative Chicken Littles to work with – two sizes fit all: One size for the conservatives (Burke), and another size for the left (Paine). Of course the conservative Chicken Littles had suspected as much all along. But now they have a learned guy with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago assuring them that they can now understand their Manichaean thought-world in terms of the two historical exemplars that Levin has selected. Because most progressives and liberals today have probably not studied Paine’s views as carefully as Levin has, they will probably shrug at the fact that he has set up Paine as the fall guy – to take the fall against Burke’s conservative views, which Levin himself clearly prefers. But make no mistake about it – Levin’s book is not designed to convince progressives and liberals to give up their views and instead embrace Burke’s views. No, Levin’s book is designed to help the already converted to feel good about being conservatives by suggesting to them that they are carrying on Burke’s British conservative spirit in our
American political system today, where we do not have a hereditary monarchy or a hereditary aristocracy – both of which Burke wanted to preserve. As a thought experiment, we might ask, “Couldn’t a progressive and liberal author today take a hint from Levin and construct a supposed founding father for American conservatives today, on the one hand, and, on the other, a supposed founding father or founding mother for American progressives and liberals today to use to simplify their thought-world?” In theory, yes, an American progressive and liberal author could undertake to do this. However, I do not expect to see anybody undertake to do this. But let me explain why not. I have referred to movement conservatism. But I do not see progressives and liberals today as constituting a movement that is comparable to movement conservatism today. I know, I know, American conservatives are a fractious lot. For example, they often indulge in the I-am-holier-than-thou game by referring to other supposedly suspect Republicans as RINOs (Republicans in name only). Nevertheless, movement conservatism does, unfortunately, exist as a movement, regardless of how fractious its members may be. I hope that their fractious disagreements with one another today lead at long last to the demise of movement conservatism – because I’d prefer to see an ideological regime change on the American right. However, Levin’s book aims to reinvigorate the fractious movement – just in time for the 2014 mid-term elections. I should add that American progressives and liberals are also a fractious lot – arguably even more fractious than American conservatives. For this reason, I do not expect to see a progressive and liberal movement emerge in the near future that would be comparable to movement conservatism. Because I do not admire movement conservatism, I would not want to see a progressive and liberal counterpart movement emerge. In conclusion, I can understand why the French Revolution prompted Edmund Burke to fear a possible revolution in Britain – especially with Thomas Paine talking and writing favorably about the French Revolution. However, as everybody knows, we in the United States have never had a hereditary monarchy or a hereditary aristocracy. Therefore, we have never been in danger of having a revolution to overthrow them. As a result, I find it much harder to understand why Burke’s views appeal to movement conservatism. But thanks to Russell Kirk’s book *The Conservative Mind* (1953), mentioned above, Burke is the founding father of movement conservatism. Movement conservatism emerged in the 1950s during the Cold War. In the Cold War, Americans feared the Soviet communists, just as Burke feared the revolutionaries in the French Revolution stirring up a similar revolution in Britain. But the Cold War has ended. So movement conservatism should end. It’s time for a regime change – but Levin wants to reinvigorate the old regime of movement conservatism. During the Cold War, American conservatives appear to have become habituated to their ratcheted-up fear. This is why there are so many conservative Chicken Littles today. Their habituated fear is activated by all kinds of ideas that drive them crazy. In short, their habituated fear makes them hyper-
vigilant. The habituated fear of conservative Chicken Littles today is multi-directional. They are hyper-vigilant – on the look out for possible threats to their traditional ways of carrying on their lives. They understand that Yuval Levin is just using Thomas Paine as a historical example of a threat to the conservative ways in Britain that Burke defended. But they understand that American conservatives today need to be hyper-vigilant to fight off other threats to conservative ways posed by progressives and liberals who can be understood by conservatives as carrying on the spirit of Paine today, even though they themselves may not think of themselves as carrying on Paine’s spirit. Therefore, Burke still deserves to be the founding father of American conservatives today as they engage in multi-directional wars against threats to conservative ways. Granted, Yuval Levin may be making a proverbial Hail Mary pass by publishing this book about Burke and Paine for American conservatives. It remains to be seen how many of them will catch on to it. However, if very many of them do catch on to it, this will not be good news for the Democrats or for progressives and liberals in the 2014 mid-term elections or in 2016. Then again, conservatives may be too preoccupied with searching for and destroying supposed RINOs to bother reading Levin’s book. Progressives and liberals might want to keep an eye on Levin’s book. If his book catches on and finds a lot of conservative readers, those readers will come away from reading it feeling really good about being conservatives like Burke. Feeling good about being conservatives might help fire them up for the 2014 mid-term elections and for the 2016 elections. In the meantime, if progressives and liberals want to read good book, I’d recommend that they read Martha C. Nussbaum’s new book Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (IX.55a).

(III.111e) Linker, Damon. The Theocons: Secular America Under Siege. New York: Doubleday, 2006. Topics: American Studies; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Bottum (III.12a); Dorrien (III.40; III.41); Jenkins (III.93); Levin (III.111d); Steinfels (III.161); Wills (XII.168).

(III.112) Lloyd, G. E. R. Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1966. Topics: History of Philosophy; Classical Studies. Also see Gelpi (XII.50a); Klubertanz (XII.81a); McInerny (XII.94a); Ong (III.134). Tracy (XII.161b).

(III.113) Loyola, Ignatius. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius: A Translation and Commentary. Trans. George E. Ganss. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992. Also listed as (X.31). Topics: Roman Catholic Spirituality; Jesuit Spirituality. Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has characterized Jesuit training as Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). But Jesuits aim to be non-violent warriors who strive to follow the example of the non-violent Jesus. This is indeed a
truly apt way to characterize Jesuit training. As part of their Jesuit training, novices in the Jesuit order make a thirty-day retreat following the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. By doing this, Jesuit novices learn how to restructure their agonistic tendencies in their personal effort to become non-violent warriors capable of following the example of the non-violent Jesus. But making a thirty-day retreat following the Spiritual Exercises also involves an enormous inward turn of consciousness. Concerning Satan and demons, see Brakke (X.8); Forsyth (III.67); Pagels (III.141); Russell (III.153; III.154; III.155; III.156).


(III.115) MacLean, Paul D. The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions. New York and London: Plenum P, 1990. Topic: Neuroscience. Also see Siegel (III.157a). Paul D. MacLean contends that the human brain is made up of three separate brains, which function together interactively in the way that he characterizes as constituting the triune human brain. What MacLean refers to as the reptilian brain is the biological base for all agonistic tendencies in all animals, including the human animal.

(III.115a) Mahoney, Richard D. JFK: Ordeal in Africa. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983. Also see Douglass (III.42); Gibson (III.72e); Jenkins (III.93); Newman (III.128d).


(III.117) Mansfield, Harvey C. Manliness. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2006. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Loyola (X.31); S. Mansfield (III.117a); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a); Tillich (III.164). In this controversial book Harvey C. Mansfield of Harvard University makes one important observation that I do not consider to be controversial: “The entire enterprise of modernity . . . could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed” (230). His point is well taken. For example, Shakespeare’s character Othello will no longer be a heroic cultural role model in modernity as he was in a residually oral late medieval culture.
a similar way, Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur will no longer be heroic cultural role models in modernity as they were in their respective oral cultural contexts. However, Jesus as portrayed in the Gospel of Mark will endure as a non-violent heroic cultural role model in modernity. As a result, I might modify Mansfield’s claim a bit to say that modernity will not keep non-violent manliness unemployed. Ong has suggested that modernity is powered by a strong tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism, as exemplified in Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism. The strength of the modern tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism will lead gradually over the centuries to the demise of the old oral heroic cultural ideal of manliness exemplified in the warrior such as Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur and Othello. The gradual demise is exemplified in the “mock heroic” poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now, Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has pointed out that Jesuit training is Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). His point is well taken. But Jesuit training is training for non-violent warriors. With this understanding in mind, I would generalize from the example of Jesuit training and say that all people in modern culture should cultivate being non-violent warriors. In short, all people in modern culture should strive to be heroic in their own eyes and in their own self-regard and their own self-respect. To be blunt, the alternative to being heroic is being depressed. We all need Warrior training to help us be effective non-violent warriors and thereby avoid being depressed, inasmuch as it is possible to avoid being depressed.

(III.117a) Mansfield, Stephen. Mansfield’s Book of Manly Men: An Utterly Invigorating Guide to Being Your Most Masculine Self. Nashville: Nelson Books/Thomas Nelson/HarperCollins, 2013. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hook and Reno (III.86); Kennedy (III.106b); Loyola (X.31); H. C. Mansfield (III.117); McNamee (III.121); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a); Tillich (III.164). The title Mansfield’s Book of Manly Men: An Utterly Invigorating Guide to Being Your Most Masculine Self is pretentious and pompous. But the title “Manly Men” would have been apt and sufficient — without a subtitle. Unfortunately, the title of the book suggests that being pretentious and pompous is manly — “Hey, guys, look at me — I put my name in the title in case you’re not smart enough to notice that I’m the author of this book!” Talk about self-promotion! I hope that nobody else follows his example. In my estimate, we do not need any further books with titles like “Farrell’s Book of Manly Men” or “Kennedy’s Book of Manly Men” — or the like. Incidentally, Senator John F. Kennedy did publish a book titled Profiles in Courage (III.106b) — but without putting his last name in the title. In any event, the ancient Greek word “andreia”
means courage and manly. Can girls and women be courageous? Sure. Can boys and men be courageous? Sure. But Plato and Aristotle claim that the virtue of courage is the mean between the extremes of being brash and being cowardly. They do not think we humans are born virtuous. So they see the virtue of courage as something we must work to cultivate in ourselves. However, they would probably say that we do not usually work to cultivate being brash or being cowardly. For them, being brash and being cowardly tend to come more spontaneously to us than being courageous does. In other words, for them, there are two broad ways to miss the mark and be unvirtuous. In Plato’s dialogues known as the Republic and the Phaedrus, we learn about three parts of the human psyche: (1) the rational part, (2) the desiring part, and (3) the spirited part (Greek, “thumos” or “thymos”). Courage, as just explained, is the virtue cultivated in connection with the part of the psyche known in Greek as “thumos” (or “thymos”). Stephen Mansfield’s title sounds brash, to put it mildly. According to Plato and Aristotle, being brash is the bipolar opposite of being cowardly. So in the spirit of giving credit where credit is due, let’s at least give Stephen Mansfield credit for a title that does not sound cowardly. In effect, in his book Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (III.134), the published version of his 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong studies the psychodynamism that Plato and Aristotle both refer to as “thumos” (or “thymos”), but Ong does not happen to advert explicitly to their discussions. Instead of referring to the Greek word “thumos” (or “thymos”), Ong settles on using the term agonistic to characterize the typical way in which this psychodynamism works. The Greek word “agon” means contest, struggle. (The extreme opposite of an agonistic spirit would be a catatonic state. In other words, clinical depression involves depression of the agonistic spirit.) The most important contribution that Ong makes in his book-length study of male agonistic tendencies is that boys and men need to work out a specifically masculine sense of identity. Moreover, according to him, boys and men need to work out a specifically masculine sense of identity in relation to other boys and men. (Ong does not happen to advert to girls and women working out a specifically feminine sense of identity in relation to other girls and women. However, this appears to be the case for girls and women.) Arguably, an earlier counterpart to Stephen Mansfield’s book is Brian S. Hook and R. R. Reno’s book Heroism and the Christian Life: Reclaiming Excellence (Westminster John Knox Press, 2000). But also see Maurice B. McNamee’s compendious book Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry (III.121) and Robert Faulkner’s recent study The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics (III.48a). But let’s also note that the famous Protestant theologian Paul Tillich published a fine book titled The Courage to Be (III.164) and that the conservative polemicist Harvey Mansfield in political science at Harvard University published his
controversial book titled *Manliness* (III.117). For a Catholic treatment of
the cardinal virtue of courage (also known as fortitude), see Josef Pieper’s
book *The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance* (X.41a). (The cardinal virtue of temperance is also known as
moderation.) In addition, the Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the
Chicago Theological Seminary published a series of five books in the
early 1990s that he co-authored with Douglas Gillette about the four
masculine archetypes of maturity: (1) the King archetype, (2) the Warrior
archetype, (3) the Magician archetype, and (4) the Lover archetype.
(According to them, girls and women have a feminine set of archetypes
parallel to each of these four masculine archetypes: (1) the Queen
archetype, (2) the Warrior, (3) the Magician, and (4) the Lover.) Their
book *The Warrior Within: Accessing the Knight [Archetype] Within the
Male Psyche* (III.124) is most relevant to Stephen Mansfield’s book,
because courage involves accessing the Warrior archetype in the
archetypal level of the human psyche. As they see the Warrior archetype,
they describe it as having three basic forms: (1 & 2) two bipolar “shadow”
forms and (3) an optimal form. The two bipolar “shadow” forms of the
Warrior archetype involve being brash and being cowardly. In other
words, for them, as for Plato and Aristotle, there are two broad ways to
miss the mark – and most of us tend to miss the mark a lot. According
to Moore and Gillette, optimal masculine development of maturity involves
the optimal development of each of the four masculine archetypes of
maturity. In theory, they may be right about this. However, they have not
worked out effective practices to help men learn how to experience the
optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes. So in effect, they have left
the door open for Stephen Mansfield to try his hand in helping white
Protestant men work out a fresh way to establish a specifically masculine
sense of identity (to use Ong’s term). On a deeper level I do not
understand Moore’s vision of how men might advance psychologically
toward the four optimal forms of the masculine archetypes of maturity. Let
me explain the difficulty I have with his vision. He claims that all boys
and men also have a set of four feminine archetypes of maturity in the
archetypal level of their psyches. However, he is silent about how men
need to resolve psychological issues in their psyches involving the
“shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes of maturity. But just how far
can men hope to advance toward the optimal forms of the masculine
archetypes of maturity without also paying attention to and resolving the
“shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes in their psyches? For example,
if a man were able to access the optimal forms of the four masculine
archetypes, but was locked into “shadow” forms of the four feminine
archetypes in his psyche, he might work superbly with other men. But he
would probably have serious problems working with women. As
everybody knows, today women are in the work-force. So today men also
need to work to resolve issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms
of the four feminine archetypes in their psyches – even men who have
learned how to access the optimal forms of the four masculine archetypes need to do this. Various forms of misogyny are signs that the persons manifesting them have not resolved issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes in their psyches. In a similar way, various forms of misandry are signs that the persons manifesting them have not resolved issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four masculine archetypes in their psyches. So I agree with Ong that boys and men need to establish a specifically masculine sense of identity. For men, working out a specifically masculine sense of identity involves the four masculine archetypes of maturity discussed by Moore and Gillette. However, to repeat, in addition to working out a strong sense of masculine identity, men also need to resolve issues in their psyches involving “shadow” forms of the four feminine archetypes of maturity.


(III.121) McNamee, Maurice B. *Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Topics: Cultural Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Aristotle (X.3a); Bennett (II.8a); Bowman (III.12b); Buell (X.8a); Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); deSilva (III.38a); Farrell (III.45); Faulkner (III.48a); Foxhall and Salmon (III.68a); Freeman (III.71b); Friend and Glover (III.72a); Krause (III.110a); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Neyrey (III.128e); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Rosen and Sluiter (III.152b); Salzman (III.157).
(III.121a) Menninger, Karl A. *Man against Himself.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. A classic. Topic: Psychoanalytic Theory. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); A. Miller (III.122a); Pinker (III.145). Karl A. Menninger, M.D., works with Freud’s famous terminology of eros and thanatos, the life-instinct and the death-instinct, to examine self-destructive tendencies in detail. No doubt the human psyche contains self-destructive tendencies as well as other forms of destructive tendencies. Through a series of graphs (395-97), Menninger diagrams his basic argument. He posits a supposedly natural course of human development and growth. In this imaginary schema, the instincts involving eros and aggression – which are parallel to Plato’s desire and thymos, or thymos -- are free to proceed to run their natural course of growth and development and thereby achieve their supposedly natural goal. But each human person undergoes traumatic experiences, some of which are repressed from conscious memory. Repressed or not, those traumatic experiences impacted the ways in which the instincts are experienced and expressed, thereby diverting the human person from the supposedly natural goal of those instincts. However, traumatic experiences are universal. They are part of the human condition. Therefore, Menninger’s conceptual construct of the supposedly natural goal of the human instincts is a romantic idealization, because the natural course of human life involves the experience of traumatization. Therefore, the goal of human life is to work toward freeing oneself from the impacts of traumatization to the extent that this is possible to do. Nevertheless, Menninger’s account of narcissism is perceptive. He says, “Nothing inhibits love [of others] so much as self-love [i.e., narcissism]” (381). “Narcissism is a thirst that is never slaked, and blocks the real enjoyment of anything” (383). “Few indeed escape some of the cloying handicap of narcissism” (382).


(III.122a) Miller, Alice. *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence.* Trans. Hildegarde Hannum and Hunter Hannum. New York: Noonday P/Farrar Straus Giroux, 1990. Topics: Psychoanalytic Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Bradshaw (X.7); Erikson (I.57a); Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); A. Miller (I.112a); Menninger (III.121a); Pinker (III.145).


(III.127b) Nathanson, Paul and Katherine K. Young. *Legalizing Misandry: From Public Shame to Systemic Discrimination against Men*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2006. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127c); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).

(III.127c) ---. *Spreading Misandry: The Teaching of Contempt for Men in Popular Culture*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2001. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b); Patai (III.142a); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).

Phillip F. Nelson assumes that then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson initiated the plot to assassinate President John F. Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963. But Nelson shows no evidence of having considered the possibility that anyone else could have initiated the assassination plot. No doubt murder had been a part of Johnson’s way of proceeding as he rose through the political ranks in Texas. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had experience in staging elaborate assassinations such as President Kennedy’s assassination. So did Johnson, or one of his men, bring certain CIA officials onboard for the assassination plot? Or did certain disgruntled CIA officials hatch the assassination plot and then bring Johnson aboard, because he would be crucial to the coverup after President Kennedy’s assassination? I think that the assassination plot began with certain disgruntled CIA officials who then brought others into the conspiracy. But I don’t think that any of the CIA officials involved in the conspiracy would have been so foolish as to leave an incriminating paper trail behind in the CIA files.

(III.128) Neumann, Erich. *The Origins and History of Consciousness*. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1954. A classic. Topic: Jungian Theory. Also see Campbell (III.20); N. Ellis (III.44a); Farrell (XII.37b); L. J. Friedman (X.22a); Houston (XII.72b); Neumann (X.36e). In this work Erich Neumann has skillfully synthesized numerous points from C. G. Jung’s numerous writings to produce a coherent account of the origins and development of ego-consciousness according to Jung. In his big collection of essays titled *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture* (III.140), Ong sums up Neumann’s Jungian account of the eight stages of consciousness in one paragraph-length sentence: “The stages of psychic development as treated by Neumann are successively (1) the infantile undifferentiated self-contained whole symbolized by the uroboros (tail-eater), the serpent with its tail in its mouth, as well as by other circular or global mythological figures [= Erikson’s Trust vs. Mistrust], (2) the Great Mother (the impersonal womb from which each human infant, male or female, comes, the impersonal femininity which may swallow him [or her] up again [= Erikson’s Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt], (3) the separation of the world parents (the principle of opposites, differentiation, possibility of change) [= Erikson’s Initiative vs. Guilt], (4) the birth of the hero (rise of masculinity and of the personalized ego) [= Erikson’s Industry vs. Inferiority] with its sequels in (5) the slaying of the mother (fight with the dragon: victory over primal creative but consuming femininity, chthonic forces) [= Erikson’s Identity vs. Role Confusion], and (6) the slaying of the father (symbol of thwarting obstruction of individual achievement, [and also symbol of thwarting obstruction] of what is new) [= Erikson’s Intimacy vs. Isolation], (7) the freeing of the captive (liberation of the ego from endogamous kinship libido and emergence of the higher femininity, with woman now as
Concerning personalism, see Burrow (X.9; X.10); Lonergan (X.30; X.30a); Ong (X.39; X.40). Freudians refer to the psychological integration of stage eight as involving the emergence of ego-integrity. Robert Moore refers to it as involving the emergence of the optimal self system. Lawrence J. Friedman (X.22a: 452) reports that late in his life Erik H. Erikson further delineated the inner struggle for Ego-Integrity vs. Disgust, Despair. Erikson says that ego-integrity is characterized as (i) Luminous, not Obscure; (ii) Active, not Inactivated; (iii) Whole, not Fragmented; (v) Coherent, not Incoherent; (vi) Continuous, not Scattered; (vii) Generative, not Impotent; (viii) Inclusive, not Isolated; (ix) Aware, not Numb; (x) Indivisible, not Divided; (xi) Chosen, not Bypassed; (xii) Safely Bound, not Invaded. Even though Erikson’s twelve “not” descriptors are enormously informative, the Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of Chicago Theological Seminary claims that there are sixteen “shadow” forms of the eight archetypes of maturity (four masculine archetypes of maturity and four feminine archetypes of maturity). In theory, I would expect ego-integrity to be most adequately characterized by sixteen “not” descriptors, instead of just twelve. However, Moore (I.115a: 200-01) acknowledges that he has used Theodore Millon’s system of psychopathology to identify the eight “shadow” forms that accompany the masculine archetypes of maturity. In Modern Psychopathology: A Biosocial Approach to Maladaptive Learning and Functioning (Philadelphia; London; Toronto: Saunders, 1969), Millon uses technical terminology to list eight maladaptive coping strategies: (i) passive-detachment, (ii) active-detachment, (iii) passive-dependence, (iv) active-dependence, (v) passive-independence, (vi) active-independence, (vii) passive-ambivalence, (viii) active-ambivalence. But Moore also claims that each human person has both four masculine archetypes of maturity and four feminine archetypes of maturity. So if Millon’s eight maladaptive coping strategies are also characteristic of the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes of maturity, then, in theory, this would bring us back to expecting a total of sixteen “not” descriptors to characterize ego-integrity – admittedly, with a certain similarity among eight respective “not” descriptors. This way of proceeding would give us eight “not” descriptors regarding our relationships with men (e.g., not passive-detachment = not characterized by passive-detachment in relationships with men) and eight “not” descriptors regarding our relationships with women (e.g., not passive-detachment = not characterized by passive-detachment in relationships with women). Because our relationship with our mother begins when we are in our mother’s womb, our projections of
the feminine archetypes of maturity probably begin when we are in our mother’s womb. For this reason, the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes may be deeper in our psyches than are the “shadow” forms of the masculine archetypes. If this is the case, it would be far more difficult for us to resolve the backlog of unresolved mourning of our nondeath losses involving the feminine archetypes. Because of men’s violence against women apparently involves men feeling threatened by the “shadow” forms of the feminine archetypes in their psyches, this would mean that men’s violence against women will require the men involved to resolve their backlog of unresolved mourning of nondeath losses involving the feminine archetypes in their psyches. But that is not an easy task for anyone to undertake. According to Neumann, all of us live in a feminine life-world in stages one, two, and three of the eight stages of consciousness – before the birth of the Hero in stage four, roughly around the time of puberty. In the second edition of *The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who we Are* (III.157a), Daniel J. Siegel discusses nine domains of integration in the new epilogue: (1) Integration of consciousness, (2) Bilateral Integration [of the left and right hemispheres of the brain], (3) Vertical Integration [of a range of neural processes, including the brain in the skull, the intestinal input, and the heart’s input], (4) Memory Integration, (5) Narrative Integration, (6) State Integration [state of being, or state of mind], (7) Interpersonal Integration, (8) Temporal Integration, (9) Transpirational Integration [a kind of “integration of integration”] (380-86).


(III.128d) Newman, John M. *JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power*. New York: Warner Books, 1992. Topic: American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Gibson (III.72e); Jenkins (III.93); Mahoney (III.115a); Turse (III.165).

Nirenberg, David. *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*. New York: Norton, 2013. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Biberman (III.10a); Carroll (III.21a); Crossan (III.35); Josephus (III.105).

Nisbett, Richard E. and Dov Cohen. *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South*. Boulder, CO: Westview P, 1996. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies. Also see Bowman (III.12b); Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); Farrell (III.45); Freeman (III.71b); Friend and Glover (III.72a); Krause (III.110a); McNamee (III.121); Newell (III.128a; III.128b; III.128c); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Salzman (III.157).


Nussbaum, Martha. *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2004. Topic: History of Philosophy. Also see Cairns (III.19); Cash (III.23a); McNamee (III.121); Nisbett and Cohen (III.129); Nussbaum (IX.55; IX.55a; X.38; X.38a). Because honor-shame cultures have been widespread historically, certain residual forms of shame from those earlier cultural traditions have become embedded in the cultural conditioning and customs and even laws that have continued into modern times.

O’Malley, John W. *The First Jesuits*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1993. Also listed as Marchand (XII.93a); O’Malley (XII.107); Vollmann (XII.164b). Topics: Jesuit History; Religious Studies; Cultural Studies. The Gutenberg printing press of the 1450s helped launch an unprecedented upsurge in basic literacy and formal education in Western culture. Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his Protestant followers were part of this upsurge – remember that all those Ramists in seventeenth-century New England that Perry Miller (XII.100) writes about founded Harvard College in 1636. The newly founded religious order in the Roman Catholic Church known as the Society of Jesus (aka the Jesuit order) played an enormous role in the upsurge of formal education, as John W. O’Malley ably details (200-42). Jungian theorist Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has aptly characterized Jesuit training as Warrior training (i.e., training in learning how to access the energies of the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche). Jesuit education can also aptly be characterized as Warrior training in spirit, at least prior to the delayed impact of the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church (1962-1965). See Philip Gleason’s *Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century* (III.73). In Ong’s terminology, the Roman Catholic tradition represents a residually oral cultural sensibility that is in many ways pre-modern. For example, the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that the Jesuits, the Dominicans, and other Catholic educators taught represents a residually oral sensibility.
because both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas lived in highly oral cultures. However, as a result, popes and other Roman Catholics have had difficulty adapting to modernity. Instead of adapting to modernity certain popes and other Roman Catholics dedicated themselves to contending with modernity in order to preserve and transmit Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. But Ong attempted to channel the agonistic spirit of his co-religionists by challenging them to “Christen” modernity by using their own values to relate positively to modernity. Mutatis mutandi, any group could undertake to use its own cherished values to relate positively to modernity. See Ong’s “The Mechanical Bride: Christen the Folklore of Industrial Man” (II.17).


(III.133) ---. “The Barbarian Within: Outsiders Inside Society Today.” The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 260-85. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hale (III.79); Heath and Potter (III.80); Jenkins (III.93). Reprinted in An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (I.138: 277-300). In this essay Ong works with the contrast of Greeks versus barbarians. In his “Address Before the Massachusetts General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” delivered on January 9, 1961, President-elect John F. Kennedy sounded like a Greek as he invoked not only John Winthrop’s famous imagery of a city on a hill but also Pericles’s famous boast about Athens being the model to be imitated. See Sarah Vowell (XII.164c: 245-48).

(III.134) ---. Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness. Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell UP, 1981. Accessible. Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University. Topics: Cultural Studies; Evolutionary Theory. Also see Farrell (III.45; III.46); Fetzer (III.62); Gregg (III.77); Huizinga (III.87a); Lloyd (III.112); Ong (III.132; III.135; III.136; III.140); Wilson (III.173a). The women’s movement over the last half century has helped to precipitate the contemporary crisis in masculine identity. Even though Maurice B. McNamee, S.J. (1909-2007), does not happen to refer explicitly to masculine identity In his compendious book Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the Shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry (III.121), his historical study in effect shows the shifting concept of masculine identity in the portrayals of epic heroes in Western culture. But if the portrayals of masculine identity in epic heroes shifted over the centuries, then we should not be surprised that the contemporary
crisis in masculine identity signals the need for a deep shift in masculinity for boys and men in Western culture today. In his perceptive book *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness*, the published version of his 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong argues that boys and men need to develop a distinctively masculine identity. I know, I know, you could argue that girls and women need to develop a distinctively feminine identity. Fair enough. But Ong focuses his main line of argument on human males. At times, it seems to me that he is trying to explain what he sees as male agonistic tendencies for the benefit of women, especially feminists. In the subtitle of his book Ong mentions contest. The ancient Greek word “agon” means contest, struggle. In his earlier book *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History* (1967, pages 192-286), the expanded published version of his 1964 Terry Lectures at Yale University, Ong uses the term polemic (from the Greek word “polemos” meaning war, struggle). However, he subsequently came to prefer to use the term agonistic instead.

In plain English, boys and men tend to be competitive. How many people have NEVER noticed this? By comparison, girls and women do not tend to be as competitive as boys and men. But that’s not all. (1) According to Ong, boys and men need to work out a personal sense of masculine identity. (As I’ve indicated above, girls and women need to work out a personal sense of feminine identity.) (2) According to Ong, boys and men work out a personal sense of masculine in agonistic behavior in relation to other boys and men. (Girls and women work out a personal sense of feminine identity in relation to other girls and women.) (3) According to Ong, boys and men need to establish a personal sense of masculine identity because the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in their psyches. This is also true of the psyches of girls and women.) (4) According to Ong, because the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in their psyches, boys and men may at times sense their struggle to work out a personal sense of masculine identity as a struggle against the feminine mother (or mother-figure) in their psyches and perhaps also against girls and women in their lives, including the mother (or mother-figure). In plain English, they feel threatened by the feminine figure in their psyches. (5) According to Ong, it is part of the human condition that the mother (or mother-figure) looms large in the psyche. Therefore, part of the challenge of developing one’s ego-consciousness is to struggle against the powerful feminine force in the psyche. (6) According to Ong, in theory, it is possible for boys and men to work out a distinctively masculine sense of identity without denigrating girls and women and feminine behavior and qualities. In plain English, according to Ong, masculine does NOT have to mean anti-feminine. However, I hasten to add that Ong does not turn his attention to discussing possible physical, sexual, or emotional abuse by the mother or mother-figure. But the Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary claims that men who rape women are
acting out their fear of the threatening feminine figure in the psyches that most likely is the result of being abused by the mother or mother-figure.


(III.138) ---. Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Also listed as Ong (IX.59; XI.9; XII.132). Topics: History of Education; History of Philosophy; History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; History of Technology. Also see Connors (III.30; III.31); Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Sloane (III.158; III.159); Smarr (III.159a). Ong characterizes following Ramist method as a way of composing one’s thoughts as monologic, because in theory Ramists do not explicitly advert to or argue with the adversarial position. Instead, in theory, they concentrate on presenting their own line of thought, regardless of any real or imagined adversarial position(s). In this way Ramists eschew the kind of pro-and-con debate that Thomas O. Sloane (III.158; III.159) describes. Pro-and-con debate involves what Robert J. Connors (III.30; III.31) refers to as argumentation. But in theory, Ramists proceed to compose their thoughts in the way that Connors refers to as explanation. Indeed, one should be able to explain one’s own thoughts. However, in theory, explaining one’s own position does not explicitly involve pro-and-con debate with the real or imagine adversarial position(s).


as Ong (VII.24; XII.135). Topics: History of Rhetoric; History of Technology.

(III.141) Pagels, Elaine. *The Origin of Satan*. New York: Random House, 1995. Topics: Biblical Studies; Religious Studies. Also see Brakke (X.8); Forsyth (III.67); Loyola (III.113); Pagels (I.144a); Russell (III.153; III.154; III.155; III.156).

(III.141a) Palecek, Mike. *The Dynamic Duo: The White Rose Blooms in Wisconsin: Kevin Barrett, Jim Fetzer & the American Resistance*. Ed. Chuck Gregory. San Bernardino, CA: CWG P, 2013. Topics: American Studies; Cultural Studies; JFK Assassination. Also see Fetzer (III.51; III.55; III.56). One focus of Mike Palecek’s 450-page anthology *The Dynamic Duo* is on my former colleague at the University of Minnesota Duluth (UMD), James H. (“Jim”) Fetzer. Jim (born 1940) and I (born 1944) both started teaching at UMD in the fall of 1987 – he in philosophy, and I in writing studies (as my former department is now known). He retired from UMD in May 2006; I, in May 2009. After Jim retired from UMD, he and his wife moved to a suburb of Madison, Wisconsin, to be near their daughter and her family. (Kevin Barrett also lives in the Madison area.) Within philosophy, Jim’s specialization is the philosophy of science. He has established a distinguished publication record in his field. As a public intellectual, Jim is probably most widely known for his work on JFK’s assassination. He has edited three anthologies of essays about JFK’s assassination (III.51; III.55; III.56). I greatly admire Jim’s persistent and perceptive scholarly inquiries into the death of President John F. Kennedy. However, as a public intellectual, Jim has also been active in analyzing 9/11 and other well-known events. Kevin Barrett has also been active in discussing 9/11. Palecek’s anthology provides a wide range of materials about their various investigations as public intellectuals. Now, long before I started at UMD in 1987, I had been familiar with the expression about “the clenched fist of logic and the open hand of rhetoric.” Jim represents the spirit of “the clenched fist of logic.” In short, he is characteristically overly insistent about his own views. (Disclosure: Yes, I like to urge my views on others, but I usually try to avoid sounding as assertive as Jim does.) In addition, he tends to talk very fast – faster than, say, television newscasters typically talk. Rat-tat-tat. (Disclosure: No, I do not talk as fast as he does.) So if $2 + 2 = 4$ (in a decimal-based system of math), then the spirit of “the clenched fist of logic” + fast talking = what? How about a television infomercial? Rat-tat-tat. Razzle-dazzle. In a television infomercial, the fast talk is designed to move us to assent quickly, without further reflection, to the information that has been presented and order the product. In Jim’s fast talk, the fast talk appears to be designed to move us to assent quickly, without further reflection, to the information contained in his argument and buy into his argument. (Disclosure: Yes, I would prefer to have people eventually buy into the arguments I present, but preferably after they have
had sufficient time to digest my arguments and consider them carefully.)

One further point. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle worked with the idea of the mean between the extremes as the way to conceptualize the virtue of courage. For them, courage was the mean between the extremes of being brash and being cowardly. Jim tends to be brash. (Disclosure: Yes, I can remember times when I have been brash.) Now, in the anthology James Manns in philosophy at the University of Kentucky sympathetically details how and why Jim was not granted tenure there (78-85). Briefly, the tenured faculty in philosophy there could not bring themselves to hold their noses and vote to give their brash junior colleague tenure, even though he had established a distinguished publication record. Despite his publications, they decided that they would prefer not to have their brash junior colleague around for years and years to come as a tenured colleague. In any event, this episode shows that Jim has paid a price at times for being brash. Why does Jim tend to be brash? Evidently, he himself has no insight about this, or else he chose not to tell us his insight about this tendency in response to Palecek’s questioning him about his life. (Disclosure: No, I have not been interviewed about my life for publication. In this respect, I am not able to put myself in Jim’s shoes in his interview with Palecek.) Fortunately, you can read Palecek’s anthology without being distracted by these characteristics of Jim’s typical demeanor, because the medium of the printed book somewhat mutes and filters out these distracting features of his behavior. In addition, print invites further reflection. And you should always reflect carefully on things Jim says, as you should always reflect carefully on things other people in the public arena say, including things I say in this customer review. Now, Jim and Kevin Barrett (born 1959) are the dynamic duo mentioned in the main title. At one time, they served as the hosts of a radio talk show with that name. The anthology includes transcribed interviews conducted by Palecek with each of them. In those pieces, Palecek asks each of them in turn about his life. I found the biographical information about each of them informative, but not especially insightful. The anthology contains a number of other pieces by various authors, including Palecek, covering a wide range of topics related to Jim’s and/or Kevin’s interests. And a selection of photographs; a bibliography of books, articles, and radio shows; and a useful index. (Disclosure: I am quoted in the anthology stating some of my impressions about Jim [169-70].)


Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai and Koertge (III.142c).


(III.142c) Patai, Daphne and Noretta Koertge. *Professing Feminism: Education and Indoctrination in Women’s Studies*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Hajdin (III.78b); Nathanson and Young (III.127b; III.127c); Patai (III.142a).


(III.145) Pinker, Steven. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking/Penguin Group, 2011. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Felson (III.49); Fromm (III.72b); Jacoby (III.90a); Kilmartin and Allison (III.107a); Menninger (III.121a); A. Miller (III.122a).


(III.152) Remer, Gary. *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1996. Topic: History of Rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Gary Remer does not happen to advert to Ong’s *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (III.138). Ong characterizes Ramism as monologic. Ramism encourages authors and speakers to develop their own line of thought, but without explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In contrast, the art of discourse does engage in explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In this way, the art of discourse is dialogic in spirit, not monologic in spirit. Elsewhere, Ong uses the terms polemic and irenic. Because of the refutation, the art of discourse is polemical. Because Ramism eschews the refutation, Ramism is irenic. Ong also elsewhere sees Ramus and the Ramist educational movement as part of the larger movement that is known to us as Renaissance humanism. For this reason, the extensive Ramist educational movement undoubtedly contributed to what Remer describes as the emerging rhetoric of toleration.

two degrees from Harvard, perhaps it is not surprising that he quotes Harvard Professor David S. Landes’ *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (III.111b). In three different places (55, 265, 280), Romney quotes with approval Landes’ claim that “culture makes all the difference [in economic development].” For the sake of discussion, let’s suppose that somebody objects: “No, culture does not make all the difference.” What will this objector go on to say? For example, will he or she object to the word “all” and say that culture only plays a certain role, an important role perhaps, but second to the role of what – creative entrepreneurs perhaps, or perhaps the government? But arguably the government is part of the culture, so the role of the government should not be discussed as though it is somehow separate from the culture. Moreover, unless the creative entrepreneurs are foreigners to the culture, they themselves are presumably the products of the culture. So perhaps they should not be discussed as though they were themselves somehow separate from the culture. In any event, Ong’s multivariate account of the infrastructures of Western cultural history complements Landes’ emphasis on culture as the most decisive factor in economic development.


(III.157) Salzman, Philip Carl. *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East*. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books/Prometheus Books, 2008. Topic: Cultural Studies. Also see Kepel (III.107); Pryce-Jones (III.147a); Wright (III.174).

Siegel, M.D., a child psychiatrist at the UCLA School of Medicine, is mighty fond of his own ideas. He has learned the trick of getting high on his own ideas – he sounds almost euphoric throughout the second edition of his book *The Developing Brain: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are*. In addition, he positively loves to use technical jargon. Please don’t misunderstand me here. I have no doubt that our relationships and our brains interact. For years C. G. Jung and his followers have discussed how archetypes work in babies as they form relationships with the mother-figures and father-figures and others. Presumably the archetypes that babies project onto caregivers are based in the babies’ brains. The Jungian theorist Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary (I.115a) refers to the archetypes that babies projected onto the mother-figure and the father-figure as the Queen archetype and the King archetype, respectively. John Bowlby and his followers have enormously expanded attachment theory. Attachments involve what Jung and his followers called archetypes. As is well known, brain research has also grown tremendously in recent years. No doubt Siegel is familiar with much of the professional literature about the brain. But here is one concern I have: Just how tentative are the professional studies of the brain? For example, if certain studies of the brain are really tentative and exploratory, should we take Siegel’s almost euphoric enthusiasm about certain points with a grain of salt, as they say? Basically, Siegel wants to advance what he styles as interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB). By definition, IPNB involves relating studies of interpersonal relationships and studies of neurobiology. By definition, relating A and B to one another involves integrating them with one another. It is the prospect of such integration that Siegel finds so exciting. Incidentally, Jung and his followers have been discussing integration for years. What they refer to as integration is the equivalent to what Freudians refer to as ego-integrity. So both Freudians and Jungians are in favor of integrations, and so is Siegel. In the epilogue (379-87), Siegel delineates nine domains of integration. Siegel works with studies in attachment theory (91-145). In attachment theory, optimal attachments are described as secure attachments. These secure attachments (117-120) stand in contrast with nonsecure attachments. (Secure attachments are coded as B on the Adult Attachment Inventory that Siegel refers to.) On page 99, Siegel identifies three different forms of nonsecure attachments as manifested in adults, which he discusses later in the book: (Coded as A on the AAI): dismissing attachment (120-27, 324-26); (Coded as C on the AAI): preoccupied attachment (130-34, 326-28); (Coded as D on the AAI): disorganized/disoriented attachment (136-41). This brings us to the professional literature about neurobiology. On page 124, Siegel says that “the region of the brain most central to attachment also appears to be the primary mediator of autonoetic consciousness.” I appreciate the careful wording here: “appears to be.” But what is autonoetic consciousness? On page 125, Siegel says, “Autonoesis is the mind’s ability to perform mental
time travel with a sense of self in the personally experienced past, as described in Chapter 2 [46-90].” But here’s the catch: According to Siegel, adults who are characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern may not have memory in their noetic consciousness of certain events in their autobiographical memory. So we are considering two distinct kinds of memory in adults: (1) autobiographical memory of certain events in the distant past (i.e., noetic consciousness); (2) the memory of one’s sense of self, including one’s emotions, at an earlier age (i.e., autonoetic consciousness). Because John Bradshaw, Alice Miller, Susan Anderson, and others have popularized the conceptual construct of the Child Within (also known as the Inner Child), perhaps I can invoke this helpful construct here. When our autonoetic consciousness as described by Siegel is working optimally, we as adult can feel the feelings that we felt at children at earlier times in our lives. When we work with the construct of the Child Within, we aim to revisit the feelings that we felt at earlier times in our lives. But Siegel suggests that we as adults will not be able to do this if we happen to be characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern. This observation leads Siegel to posit that “differing brain structures support autonoetic [consciousness] versus noetic recollection [in autobiographical memory]” (125). In addition, Siegel cites studies that suggest that the differing brain structures involved: (A) the left hemisphere circuits appear to be involved in noetic consciousness (autobiographical memory); and (B) the right hemisphere circuits appear to be involved in autonoetic consciousness. These points may be correct. But so what? Will adults who are characterized by the dismissing attachment pattern benefit from knowing that their left hemisphere circuits are involved in their noetic consciousness (autobiographical memory), on the one hand, but, on the other, that their right hemisphere circuits are not evidently activated (their autonoetic consciousness)? I seriously doubt that they will benefit from knowing such stuff. But I am going to stop here. I understand that academics are expected to publish. Publish or perish, eh? I further understand that medical researchers receive big bucks to conduct their research, including brain research. At times, Siegel is careful enough in the ways in which he words his statements about the studies he is discussing. In addition, he often eventually indicates the tentativeness of the studies in neurobiology that he has discussed. Nevertheless, his almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas appears to be designed to prompt people to jump of the IPNB bandwagon. I, for one, am not going to jump on the IPNB bandwagon. But who are the people he wants to jump on his bandwagon? He appears to want to appeal to people who are attracted to stuff that has the aura of medical science – for example, psychiatrists. So if you are predisposed to being impressed by studies of neurobiology, then you might be impressed with Siegel’s work. Moreover, if you are predisposed to being impressed by an author’s almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas, Siegel will not disappoint you. I would like to know which part of his brain is involved in his almost euphoric enthusiasm for
his own ideas. My impression is that the brain chemistry involved in his almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas is powerful stuff. Albert Ellis helped us learn how to recognize when we are catastrophizing – that is, how we tend to think thoughts that make us feel down and depressed about something. But Siegel has learned how to get high on his own ideas. So I will style his tendency as triumphalizing – that is, feeling a sense of triumph and enthusiasm as the result of one’s own ideas. Siegel’s almost euphoric enthusiasm for his own ideas exceeds sober exuberance.


(III.158) Sloane, Thomas O. On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1997. Also listed as Sloane (XII.156). Topics: History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory; Cultural Studies. Also see Farrell (III.46; III.47); Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.159); Smarr (III.159a). Thomas O. Sloane focuses on the pro-and-con debate protocol in traditional rhetoric in Western culture. But not only the verbal art known as rhetoric, but also the verbal art known as dialectic inculcated the spirit of pro-and-con debate. In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (III.138), Ong shows how Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism in effect moved away from the protocol of pro-and-con debate in favor of setting forth one’s own line of argument without the refutation of real or imaginary adversarial positions or possible objections.

(III.159) ---. “Reinventing Inventio.” College English 51 (1989): 461-73. Topics: History of Rhetoric; Rhetorical Theory. Also see Farrell (III.46; III.47); Johnson and Johnson (III.101); Sloane (III.158). Cicero thought that the standard step known in Latin as inventio (known in English as invention), the step of trying to discover possible arguments one could use in debate, would be advanced by conducting pro-and-con debate with oneself about one’s own thesis statement. One would first negate one’s own thesis statement by adding the word “not” to the predicate, thus forming the antithesis of one’s own position. Next, one would formulate arguments that could be advanced in support of the antithesis statement. Next, one would set about formulating counter-arguments to those arguments, because one could use the counter-arguments in one’s own presentation in the debate to advance one’s own thesis statement. For examples of how the spirit of pro-and-con debate can be incorporated into lesson plans for use in the classroom, see David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson’s Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge in the Classroom, 3rd ed. (III.101).

Studies; Cultural Studies; Literary Studies. Also see Lesser and Robinson (III.111a); Ong (III.138); Sloane (III.158).


(III.161c) Stone, Roger with Mike Colapietro. *The Man Who Killed Kennedy: The case Against LBJ*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013. Topics: JFK Assassination; American Studies. Also see Douglass (III.42); Nelson (III.127b). We Americans collectively represent the “new Adam.” This is part of our cultural heritage, part of our cultural DNA. You remember the story of Adam and Eve in Genesis. In the Christian tradition of thought, the story of Adam and Eve is also known as the story of the Fall. However, for the “new Adam” there has not been any Fall. As the collective “new Adam,” we Americans are “innocents” – as the biblical Adam was “innocent” before the supposed Fall. We Americans are such “innocents” that we prefer to imagine that a coup d’etat did not occur on November 22, 1963, in Dallas. Some Americans even prefer to imagine that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone shooter who shot President John F. Kennedy with a magic bullet that also hit Governor John Connally, who was seated in front of Kennedy. But Lee Harvey Oswald was a patsy. The conspirators set him up. Then they had Jack Ruby kill him. In *The Man Who Killed Kennedy: The Case Against LBJ*, Roger Stone, a well-known Republican, outlines the conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. We can all be thankful that LBJ and his co-conspirators and the Warren Commission did not pin President Kennedy’s assassination on the (now former) Soviet Union or on Fidel Castro. However, the time has come for us to set aside the fiction about Oswald and recognize that a coup d’etat occurred in Dallas on November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated. His assassination was a coup d’etat that made then Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson the new President of the United States. President Kennedy was assassinated at a time when the Cold War was going strong. Fortunately, LBJ and his co-conspirators did not try to attribute JFK’s assassination to the (now former) Soviet Union or to Fidel Castro. Instead, they elaborately framed Lee Harvey Oswald as the patsy. Then they had Jack Ruby kill Oswald to silence him. However, even though the Cold War is now over, many Americans prefer to believe the myth about Oswald supposedly being the lone gunman. But Stone weaves memories and information about a number of Republicans into the book. For example, he reveals that when Richard M. Nixon watched the television broadcast on November 24, 1963, about Jack Ruby killing Oswald, Nixon recognized Ruby as a “Johnson man.” Nixon knew Ruby as a paid informant in the 1940s for the House Un-American Activities Committee. On page 392, Stone quotes the following statement made by Noam Chomsky in Budapest when he was asked about the energy that has gone into investigating Kennedy’s assassination: “‘Who knows and who cares,’ he replied. ‘Plenty of people get killed all the time. Why does it matter that one of them happened to be John F. Kennedy? If there was some reason to believe there was a high level conspiracy, it might be interesting, but the evidence against that is overwhelming. And after that, it’s just a matter of if it happened to be a jealous husband or the Mafia or someone else, what difference does it make? It’s just taking energy away from serious issues to the ones that don’t matter.’” Stone uses Chomsky’s dismissive statement as a springboard to set forth his own reply to him: “‘Why care about a murder that happened fifty years ago? The Kennedy assassination goes hand-in-hand with the popular distrust of the government that sprung up in the late 1960s. The assassination of Kennedy dug the foundation of distrust; the lies that landed us in [the] Vietnam War and the Watergate break-in commented it. In order to win back the trust of the people, it is the government’s responsibility to come clean” (392-93). In theory, I agree that the government should come clean about President Kennedy’s assassination. However, I do not expect to see this happen. Why not? Let me explain why not. The dark forces that LBJ conspired with to assassinate President Kennedy (Big Oil, the CIA, the Mafia, the Cuban exiles) are forces that are still around in this nation. Those dark forces, especially the CIA, would work might hard to prevent the government from coming clean about President Kennedy’s assassination. Moreover, the dark forces would be aided and abetted by the news-media establishment, which has diligently served as the gatekeeper of the myth about Oswald being the lone shooter. The news-media establishment has a vested interest in maintaining the myth that they have worked so diligently to maintain for decades now. Nevertheless, adult Americans need to be disabused of the myth about Oswald supposedly being the lone assassin of President Kennedy. I agree with much of Stone’s case against LBJ. However, I do not think that LBJ
initiated the plot to assassinate JFK. I think that certain disgruntled CIA officials initiated the idea and then brought LBJ into the plot to gain his cooperation in the cover-up.


(III.164) Tillich, Paul. *The Courage to Be*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1952. Topic: Religious Studies. Also see Loyola (X.31); H. C. Mansfield (III.117); S. Mansfield (III.117a); Moore and Gillette (III.124); Ong (III.132; III.134; III.135; III.136; III.137); Pieper (X.41a).


(III.166a) Ventresca, Robert A. *Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII*. Cambridge, MA: and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2013. Topic: Church History. Also see Carroll (III.21a); Eisner (III.44); Fischel and Ortmann (III.64).


(III.168) Wadlington, Warwick. *Reading Faulknerian Tragedy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1987. Topics: Literary Studies; Cultural Studies; Personalism; Therapy. Also see Farrell on Faulkner (III.45); on Personalism and
Therapy, also see Buber (I.24); Buzzard (I.26); D. W. Johnson (I.92); Malone and Malone (I.107).


(III.172a) ---. *Explaining America: The Federalist*. New York: Doubleday, 1981. Topics: American Studies; History of Rhetoric. Also see Bailyn (III.5a); Maier (III.115b).

